Balanced force structure. by Terkhorn, Alton K.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive






















Jerry L. McCa ffrey
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
T 233046

iECuRifv CiaSSiFiCatiQN OF ThiS pag£
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE
la REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
UNCLASSIFIED
1b RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS
2a SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY
2b DECLASSIFICATION /DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
3 DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF REPORT
Approved for public release;
distribution is unlimited
4 PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUM8ER(S) S MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUVBER(S)





7a NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION
Naval Postgraduate School
6c AODRESS (Cry. Sfafe. and ZIP Code)
Monterey, California 939^3-5000
7b ADDRESS (Cry, State, and ZIP Code)
Monterey. California 93^3-5000




9 PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT lOEN '.( iCAPCN NUMBER























F ElD GROUP SUB-GROUP
18 SUBJECT TERMS {Continue on reverie if neceuary and identify by block number)
600 Ship Navy, Balanced Force Structure,
Fleet Expansion Program, Naval Recovery
Program. 1.5 MAF
'•
^^SffW^h^k^^^f^P^f^tk^sT^d to rebuild the Navy and to
regain maritime superiority. It has two main objectives. The first and
nost important objective is to build a balanced force structure consisting
ft 639 specially selected ships. The second objective is politically
oriented and calls for a 600 ship count by the end of the decade.
Within five years after the Program was promulgated, the Navy's
emphasis appeared to shift from building a well balanced fleet to sustain
—
Lng a 600 Ship Navy. This thesis traces the history of the shipbuilding
programs to determine the current status of the Fleet Expansion Program,
[x pcrikdes that the original objectives are still being pursued, however,
there is an indication that the emphasis will shift in the future.
D 5 "R'?jT'ON - AVAILABILITY OF A8STRACT
f-5 .NCLASSIF'ECJNL'MITED D SAME AS RPT Q OTiC USERS
21 ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
UNCLASSIFIED
la NAVtE OF RESPONSIBLE iNDi\/iOuAL
Jerry L. McCaffrey
22b TELEPHONE (Include Area Code)
\
22c OFHCE SymBOi
(406) 373 2554 I 54Mm
)D FORM 1473,84MAR 83 APR edition may be used jnM exhausted
All other editions are ocsolete
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION QF t -iiS pa;
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
Balanced Forced Structure
by
Al ton K. Terkhorn
Lieutenant, United States Navy
B.A., Indiana University, 1978
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of





The Fleet Expansion Program is designed to rebuild the
Navy and to regain maritime superiority. It has two main
objectives. The first and most important objective is to
build a balanced force structure consisting of 639 specially
selected ships. The second objective is politically oriented
and calls for a 50C ship count by the end of the decade.
Within five years after the Program was promulgated, the
Navy's empnasis appeared to shift from building a well
balanced fleet to sustaining a 600-Ship Navy. This thesis
traces the history of :he shipbuilding programs co determine
the current status of the Fleet Expansion Program. [t
conciuoes tnat tr.e original CDjectives are st i 1 1 being
pursued, however, there is an indication that the emphasis
will shift in the future.
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I . INTRODUCTION
In 1970, the United States boasted the strongest Navy in
the world. Representing one of the greatest accumulations of
seapower in the history of the nation, the fleet consisted of
over 1000 ships and 23 aircraft carriers. However, ten years
later, the Navy had only 456 ships and 12 deployable
carriers. This massive reduction was the result of two main
overlapping factors. First, many World War Two vintage ships
reached the enc of their useful service lives during this
perioc and were subsequently retired. Secondly, there was an
outcry in the Post-Vietnam era to contain defense spencing.
Since the Navy's shipbuilding programs ver? the largest ana
most expensive items in the defense budget, they were the
easiest targets for budget cutters. Therefore,
decommissioned ships were never replaced and the naval
defense gap continuously increased until the 1980s.
By the end of the 1970s, the weaknesses of the Navy were
becoming apparent. As the United States fleet was shrinking,
the Soviet Navy was completing its transition from a small
coastal navy into the world's largest and most formidable
"blue water" navy. Furthermore, the requirements for the
United States Navy were also growing, since events in Iran
and Afghanistan necessitated an increased naval presence
S
in the Indian Ocean. Therefore, the United States Navy had a
full-time three ocean commitment with a much smaller fleet,
and was matched against a superior foe.
In response to the Soviet Naval threat, the Reagan
Administration developed a naval recovery program to regain
maritime superiority. There were seven main elements in this
program, but one of the most important components called for
the "establishment of a shipbuilding, reactivation, and
conversion program to increase the force with the right kinds
of ships...." CRef. l:p. 31 This element was the foundation
for the Fleet Expansion Program, or as it is also called, the
600-Sh ip Navy
.
The Fleet Expansion Program haa two goals. The first ana
most important objective was to build a ''balanced force
structure" based on the six building blocks seen in Figure 1.
Using the balanced force structure concept, each task group
would be composed of the proper mix of different ship types.
This would provide protection for the entire task group
against air, surface or sub-surface threats. To achieve the
balanced force structure developed by the Reagan
Administration, the Navy would need at least 639 specially
selected ships. Furthermore, this build-up would require one
of the most dedicated and aggressive peacetime shipbuilding
programs in the history of the Navy.
A. 15 CARRIER BATTLE GROUPS
B. 4 SURFACE ACTION GROUPS
C. 100 ATTACK SUBMARINES
D. MAF-PLUS-MAB LIFT CAPABILITY
E. 31 MIME COUNTERMEASURE SHIPS
F. SUFFICIENT NUMBER OF SUPPORT SHIPS
Figure 1 Foundations for the
Fleet Expansion Program
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The second goal was more politically oriented, but still
essential to the Navy. This objective called for a 600 ship
count by the end of the decade. Since many Congressmen think
of shipbuilding in terms of numbers of ships being built
rather than force structure or capability, the 600 ship count
was a goal which Congressmen could aim for and could
comprehend. In essence, this goal promoted congressional
advocacy and support. Furthermore, it gave the Fleet
Expansion Program a common purpose for the legislative anc
executive branches.
Therefore, the Fleet Expansion Program was a we i i-rounaed
program which was geared tor success. First, it fulfilled
the need to increase the numDer of ships to counter tne
Soviet: threat. Second!'/, the expansion would not ze
haphazard. Since Reagan's Balanced Force Structure imposed
the minimum composition for the different task groups, the
expansion would be controlled so that only the right type of
ships would be built. Combined with the balanced force
structure, the expansion would enable the Navy to regain
maritime superiority. Finally, since the expansion would be
a massive undertaking over a long period of time, it would
need a driving goal to constantly renew a dedicated and
concentrated effort from Congress. The 600 ship goal
provided this stimulus. Furthermore, the time constraint on
the goal would establish the pace for a rapid build-up.
11
However, by 1986, the emphasis appeared to shift from
building a well balanced fleet to building and sustaining a
600-Ship Navy. In Congressional hearings, Congressmen
continuously asked about the status of the "600-Ship Navy"
program, and how particular shipbuilding programs would
affect the outcome of the overall 600 ship count. In fact,
Congressmen were more concerned with what type of ships would
oe counted in the Naval Summary racner than how those sh :
p
categories affected the overall balance. Newspapers and
magazines evaluated the growth in the total numcer of ships.
cue dio not address the development of the force structure.
Even che :cp naval leaders socks of the Fleet Expansion
Program in terms of 600 snips rather than structure. [Ref.
2 :pp . 4-13]
With the passage of the FY 86 budget, the Reagan
Administration stated that the Navy would have 600 ships by
1989. This represented an outstanding achievement since the
force structure grew simultaneously with the growth in the
number of ships.
However, if the emphasis has shifted to sustaining this
600 ship numerical goal after 1989, then the balanced force
structure will suffer. The balanced force structure
represented the minimum force needed to regain maritime
superiority and the maximum risk acceptable to the Reagan
Administration. Therefore, any compromise short of the force
level requirements would have a detrimental effect on
12
national security. In view of the severity of the
consequences, this thesis will examine the history of
President Reagan's shipbuilding programs to determine the
current status of the Fleet Expansion Program. Specifically,
this thesis will determine whether the Administration is
still developing its original balanced force structure or if
the Administration has shifted its emphasis to sustaining a
600 ship count.
A. METHODOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION
To determine the status of the Fleet Expansion Program,
this thesis will have to examine the past, the present ana
the future. Chapter Two will develop the model of the
Balanced Force Structure advocated by the Reagan
Administration. This model wi 1 i show the force level
requirements by ship category. The chapter will also show
the importance of the different ship categories within the
task groups, and the strong interrelationship of the
different task groups within the fleet. Finally, Chapter Two
will familiarize the reader with the importance of a balanced
force structure concept.
With the exception of a few ships, the Balanced Force
Structure Model was taken from Congressional testimony.
Those ships which were not specifically mentioned in the
force build-up will still be included in the research, but
will be treated in such a way that they will not create an
13
undue bias for or against the Navy. This will be discussed
in greater detail in the next chapter.
Chapter Two used the historical research approach to
assimilate the data necessary to build the model. The next
two chapters also used the same approach, but also included
certain aspects of the Navy's Program Development approach.
The Navy determines the future composition of naval forces by
using the current force levels as a base line. Initially,
all ships which are expected to enter the fleet within the
next ten years are aaded tc the base. This includes a
i
:
ships which have oeen appropriated oy Congress ana all ships
in the current Department of Defer.se Five Year Shipbuilding
Program (FYSBP). Then all ships which will reach the end of
their useful service lives during the ten -ear per. ;c ire
excluded from the force level. This will give the
approximate future force level. Thereafter, the future force
level is compared against a standard to determine the future
deficiencies. [Ref. 3:pp. 26-30]
Chapter Three will be used to connect the past, the
present and the future. This chapter will examine the
shipbuilding history of each ship category. The primary
emphasis will be placed on how the Reagan Administration
planned on using the ship type to build and expand the fleet,
and what actually happened up to 1986. Based upon this
information and the shipbuilding time assumptions presented
below, the force structure summary will be developed for
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1989. Whereas one of the ultimate objectives is to determine
what the summary of the U.S. Naval Forces will be in 1989,
any future funding after FY 86 will not be significant for
this chapter since ships appropriated after FY 86 would not
enter the fleet until the early 1990s.
The data used to examine the history in Chapter Three
came primarily from the Jane's Fighting Ships series,
shipouildmg appropriations and congressional testimony.
Using the respected Jane s F tannng Ships series will lend
authenticity ana consistency to this thesis.
Chapter Four will use the information oeveiopea in the
previous two chapters to determine if the >Iavy will continue
to pursue the progression of a balanced force structure, or
if the Navy wi 1 shift .ts emphasis :o sustaining \ 500 ^h'.p
count
.
In the first section of Chapter Four, the Summary of U.S.
Naval Forces in 1989 will be modified to include all ships
undergoing construction. This will account for all ships
which were appropriated prior to and including FY 86. The
modified summary will then be compared against the Balanced
Force Structure Model. This process will identify those ship
categories which will not meet force level goals by the end
of the decade
.
The second section of Chapter Four will succinctly
determine the status of the Fleet Expansion Program. The
ship categories which were identified in the previous section
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will be evaluated in the the most recent FYSBP. If the
deficient ship categories are included in the FYSBP, and if
the additional shipbuilding programs will increase the size
of the fleet, then the Navy is still pursuing the expansion
of the balanced force structure. On the other hand, if the
deficient ship categories are included but are intended to be
used as replacements, then the Navy has shifted its emphasis
to sustaining the 600 ship count.
The final chapter will concisely review the
interpretations of the finaings leading to the conclusions.
Reccmmenaat i ens will ce offeree caseo on "nose conclusions.
Since the Navy has snips which are not included In the
totai snip count, zhis cr.es is will use tne same ship counting
techni was employed by the Department of defense. 7v e ships
counted are those ships which contribute to the Navy's
wartime missions. This methodology includes combatants
and ships which operate in direct support of the combatants
as seen in Figure 2.
B. ASSUMPTIONS
The Fleet Expansion Program was developed to counter the
Soviet naval threat by regaining control of the sea. This
thesis will not question the effectiveness of the program,
but will assume that the goals of the balanced force




Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBN)
Battle Forces:
Aircraft Carriers (CV/CVN) Battleships (BB)
Cruisers (CG/CGN) Destroyers (DD/DDG)
Attack Submarines (SS/SSN) Frigates (FF/FFG)











Minesweepers (MSO) Minehunters CMSH)
Mine Count ermeasure Shios CMCM)
Rep i enishment Ships:
Station Ships tr~ZE, AOR)
'-.-j-nu.n ition C AE/TAE •
Oi i sr CAE/TAQ)
S t ores ( AFS/ TAF5/TAF - :
latenai -Dcpporn rorces:
^i^c^^- p £}V © f"
Repair Ships CAR)
Submarine Tenders , -...
SSBN SUPPORT (AS/TAK)
Fleet Support Ships:
Surveillance (T-AGOS) Salvage CARS)
Submarine Rescue (ASR) Salvage/Rescue (ATS)
Fleet Ocean-going Tug (ATF/TATF)
Category A Mobilization Forces: Reserve ships which
participate in combat or direct combat support
Figure 2 Ships Included in Total Force, by type
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In developing the future force structure in Chapters Three
and Four, certain commonly held assumptions were used for the
retirement age and building time of the different ship
categories. In this thesis, the retirement age will reflect
the time from the commissioning date to the date the ship is
removed from active service. The building time will reflect
the time from when the ship was fully appropriated to the
time the ship will be delivered- The assumptions for the
different snip categories are pre sen tea in Figure 3.
Furthermore, the future force structure calculations were
oasea on the assumption that the Navy wi ! ! not deviate from
the time assumptions, except in those cases which were notea
by 1986.
C. ACRONYMS AND DEFINITIONS
Since the area being researched is ful 1 of acronyms and
sometimes confusing terminology, the following list is
included for easy reference and clarification.
1 . Category A Mobilization Forces
Ships in the Naval Reserve Force which would become
part of the deployable battle fleet in the event of
hostilities. These ships would immediately go to war and are
therefore counted in the total ship count. In 1986, tnis
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Figure 3 Time Assumptions
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2. Category B Mobilization Forces
Naval Reserve Force ships which are not counted in
the total ship count. Since these ships are principally
intended for training, they would not become a part of the






This concept is one of the centra; ideas behind the
balanced force structure. Each tasK group is organized so
that there are several layers of protection against a
hmuiti-aimensionai tnreat. :cr example, a ca: ' r* • c» i
group contains long range ana short range missile sr. : 03 :cr
ant i -air warfare. If enemy aircraft were approaching the
carrier, they would re intercepted oy the carrier's aircrart.
If the enemy penetrated through the first layer of defense,
they would then be subjected to the wrath of the long range
missile ships. Even if the enemy survived the second layer,
they would then have to pass through the short range missile
ships'' barrier. Likewise, there are several layers around
the carrier to protect against submarine and surface warfare.
4 . Marine Amph.'bious Unit (MAU)
This is the smallest Marine assault force. It is
composed of 2400 Marines, several armored vehicles and a
helicopter squadron. There are usually two units forward
deployed during peacetime. The forerunner of a larger force,
the MAU js used to protect U.S. interests overseas until a
20
larger force can arrive in the area. Approximately three to
six amphibious ships are required to lift a MAU . CRef. 4:p.
285 3
5. Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB)
This force is significantly larger than the MAU. It
is composed of 14,000 Marines, 63 armored vehicles and
artillery. The MAB has approximately 100 helicopters ana 70
fixed wing aircraft. This force would ce used to relieve a
MAU which had oeen called into action. Approximately 20
amphiOious ships are requirea tc lift a MAB. [Ret. 4:p. 286]
6
.
Mar i ne Amoh i c i ous Force ( MAF
)
This ,s the argest assau : t rcrce. Lt .3 composed y.
45,500 Marines, 70 :an:<s, 208 assau.; amphibious vehicles,
ana over 100 artillery pieces. The air wing is composed of
225 fixed wing aircraft and 230 helicopters. This force
would be used for sustained combat against an entrenched
enemy. Approximately 50 amphibious ships are required to
1 if t a MAF. [Ref . 4:p. 288]
7. Military Seal if t Command (MSC)
This is a Navy operated command which provides
services for the armed services and other government
agencies. All MSC ships are operated with civilian manned
Civil Service crews. However, a small Navy detachment is
usually carried to provide security and to operate the
communication equipment. The MSC ships are recognizable by
their T-hull designations. The MSC ships which are counted
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in the Navy's total ship count include the TAO (fleet oiler),
TAE (ammunition ship), TAF/TAFS (combat stores), TAGO (ocean
surveillance) and the TATF (fleet tug). CRef. 5:p. 165].
8. Landing Craft. Air Cushion (LCAC)
A new high speed amphibious landing craft which can
be embarked on LHAs, LHDs, LPDs and LSDs. Using an air
cushion to glide along the surface of the water, the LCACs
are faster than any other landing craft and are capaoie of
carrying 60 tons of weight. Unlike previous landing craft,
the LCACs can oe launched from over the horizon, which
provioes adc:t;cnai protection to the amphibious ships. The
LCAC program is one of the ^a., cr construction programs unaer
the Reagan Administration. ^Ref. 6:p. 101
J
9 . Service L i f e £x tens i on ?rccr am ( SLZ? )
SLEP is a program to modernize and to add an
additional 25-30 years onto the service lives of certain ship
categories. Originally, the program was intended for the
steam powered aircraft carrier (CV). However, since the
program has been successful, it will also be used on the
aging Dock Transport (LPD) ships.
10 . Warfare Areas
The Navy's missions include sea control and
projection of power. To accomplish these missions, the Navy
must be capable of performing in all five warfare areas:
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a. Anti-Air Warfare <AAW)
This area involves the destruction of hostile
aircraft and airborne weapons. The weapons may be launched
from either air, surface, subsurface or land platforms.
b. Ant i -Submarine Warfare (ASW)
This area will deny the enemy control of the sea
by destroying the enemy's submarine force.
c. Anti-Surface Warfare CASuW)
This warfare is accompi ishea oy disrupting the
enemy s sea lines of communication and denying the enemy the
use of :ne sea. This involves the destruction ana
neutralization c: enemy surtace combatants ana merchant
sn ips.
a. -.men , b i ous Warfare
The Navy will project its Marine forces into
hostile territory through sea and air assaults. This warfare
area also includes shore bombardment which comes from close
air support from the carrier and Naval Gunfire Support (NGFS)
from the surface combatants.
e. Mine Countermeasures
The primary purpose of mine countermeasures is
to keep all friendly harbors open and to clear all amphibious
assault lanes. This involves the destruction or
neutralization of hostile mine fields.
23
II . THE NAVY'S FORCE OBJECTIVES
The goals of the "Fleet Expansion Program" were two-fold.
First, the Navy would develop a "balanced" force structure.
The total number for this aggressive force structure would be
approximately 640 platforms. Secondly, the Navy would have a
snip count of 600 by the ena of the decade. Since this would
oe one of the most aggressive peacetime naval builc-ups in
the history cr the united States, the expansion wou \ a nave to
oe intricately planned anc executed to balance the war
fighting assets. In developing the Balanced 7crcs Structure
Program, the Reagan Administration would use the force
structure in .981 and extend its components proportional
achieve a naval force capable of regaining maritime
superiority. The force structure of 1981 would also be
expanded to fulfill the current force requirements (see Table
1) .
This chapter will present the goals for the new force
structure as advocated by the Reagan Administration. A model
of the Balanced Force Structure is presented by ship category
in Table 2 for easy reference.
Furthermore, this chapter will examine each ship category
in detail to determine its role in promoting the expansion




































* INCLUDES FORCES IN OVERHAUL ** INCLUDES INDIAN OCEAN
FORCES
CVBG = CARRIER BATTLE GROUP. BSAG= BATTLESHIP SURFACE
ACTION GROUP
URG = UNDERWAY REPLENISHMENT GROUP
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TABLE 2
REAGAN" S BALANCED FORCE STRUCTURE OBJECTIVES
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Destroyer Tender (AD) 9
Submarine Tender (AS) 8
Repair Ship CAR) 4
SSBN SUPPORT (AS/TAK) 6
SuDtotal, Material Support 27
Fleet Support Ships
Surveillance Ship CTAGOS) 18
Sa
:
vage 5h i p ( APS
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The Reagan Administration asserts that the aircraft
carrier is an essential ingredient for victory at sea.
Posing an offensive threat, the carrier battle group forces
the enemy into a defensive role for the protection of her
homeland. With a mobile airfield, the United States Navy can
extend its range of penetration deep into hostile territory.
This permi :s ins United States Navy to take advantage of
tactical air strikes against: the enemy anc to maintain the
vita; sea lines c: rcmmun 1 cat : en . Concurrently, the
aggregate carrier :cr~e prcviaes world vice coverage.
furthermore-, :he carrier battie grouo (CVBG) is equal
effective in peacetime. An impressive prcject.cn or power,
the CVBG promotes fcre.^n support fcr national pol . :y -r.c. s
"An important instrument of national power in a wide range of
conflict scenarios, including Third World crises, and can be
expected to remain so for the foreseeable future." [Ref. 7:
pp. 6-7]
The carrier force hit its lowest point during the Carter
Administration. The force consisted of 14 flattops, but only
12 of the ships were deployable carriers. The USS LEXINGTON
(CVT-16) was an aviation training platform without war
fighting capabilities, and the USS CORAL SEA (CV-43) was a
contingency ship without an airwing. Furthermore, the number
of deployable carriers would be further reduced by one
carrier when SLEP began with the USS SARATOGA (CV-60) in
28
1980. SLEP would add approximately 10-15 years to the
nominal 30 year life span of a carrier, but would reduce the
carrier force by at least one carrier until the turn of the
century. Eight carriers were scheduled for SLEP. Finally,
the USS LEXINGTON (CVT-16), the USS MIDWAY (CV-41) and the
USS CORAL SEA (CV-43) were scheduled for retirement in the
early 1980s. Therefore, a presently deployable carrier would
eventually have to replace the LEXINGTON, ana another gap
wou i d exist on che aecommi ssi on i ng of the presently
aep lovable MIDWAY.
The political atmosphere was equal ly turbulent for the
carriers. Opposing viewpoints en :ne future of the carr.er-.3
were heatedly ceoazeo in Congress, in :ne Jord and Carter
Administrations", and between 'cngrsss and the
administrations. Even the Navy was divided on the role and
future of the carrier. The debates centered on issues such
as large versus small, many versus few, conventional takeoff
and landing (CTOL) or vertical/short takeoff and landing
(VSTOL) based aircraft, and finally, whether the carrier was
obsolete or not. The debates were so intense that even
though funds were appropriated in FY 77 for advance
procurement of long lead items for a new carrier, the funds
were never released by the Ford or Carter Administrations.
[Ref. 5:p. 483
The debates were finally silenced by President Reagan.
His decision, in face of the charge that the large
29
conventional carrier was obsolete, was basically "Damn the
torpedoes, full speed ahead!" A significant departure from
the 12 carrier force maintained by previous administrations,
the number of carrier battle groups would be increased to 15
to fulfill the current peacetime and wartime requirements.
The requirements, shown in Table 1, called for a minimum of
7-two CVBGs and 1-one CVBG. Furthermore, President Reagan
wanted the 15 CVBGs by 19S4. CRef. 4:p. 461]
The 15 carrier battle groups would serve as one of the
foundations for expanding the fleet ana building the 3aiance<
Force Structure. With the expansion of the carrier force,
acditionai surface combatants ixnc attack submarines wouia be
needea to provide the necessary cefer.se in cepth. Hence, thi
^omoatants ana sucrr.ar-.tes -;ou . a become :he components 3f :he
carrier battle groups. Subsequently, the Mobile Logistics
Forces and the other support forces would have to be
increased to service the additional CVBGs. Likewise, more
surface combatants would be required to protect and escort
the additional support forces. This interdependence of the
force structure will be seen throughout the remainder of the




The formation of four surface action groups (SAG) would
be another essential ingredient for President Reagan's force
30
structure model. Each group would consist of a cruiser and
four destroyers centered around a reactivated Iowa class
battleship. Equipped with long range cruise missiles, girded
with gun turrets which could rapidly project 2,000-pound
shells more than 20 miles, and fortified with enough armor
plate to fend off the strongest Soviet anti-ship missile,
the battleship would be a deadly foe against any surface or
airoorne threat. The cruisers and destroyers wou i d rouna out
the balance oy providing additional anti-air warfare (AAW;
,
anti-surface warfare CASuW) , ana anti-submarine warfare CASW)
coverage :or the battleships. The SAGs */ou i d operate as
offensive strike rorces m moderate :c high threat
environment- for which a carrier battle group is not
available....", :nc 'would 3e necessary to meet the Navy 3
three ocean commitment." CRef. 4:p. 462]
Since the force level objectives were established to
provide the necessary defense in depth for an assigned tasK,
the emphasis on expanding the fleet was placed on total force
capability instead of numbers of ships. CRef, 8:p. 233
Therefore, in addition to CVBGs and SAGs, additional surface
combatants would be needed to obtain the minimum balanced
force structure capable of providing protection and support
for Marine amphibious assaults, military convoys, and the
Mobile Logistic Support Force.
Tables 3 and 4 present the surface combatant structure
for an expanded fleet. In order to better understand the
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TABLE 3
NAVY OBJECTIVE FOR SURFACE COMBATANT FORCE LEVEL
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balanced structure concept, it should be noted that cruisers
and destroyers are multi-purpose ships intended for high
threat environments. On the other hand, frigates are open
ocean escorts and are expected to operate in lower threat
areas, such as convoy escort duty.
The author notes that the force structure desired by the
Reagan Administration did not include small patrol craft
combatants. Six Pegasus (PHM) hydrofoils appropriatea during
previous administrations, were scheduled to encer the fieet
in che early l Q30s. Armed with Harpoon anti-surface missiles
and 2. rapid fire cannon, ".^.ese patrol grafts were designed to
conduce rase attack raids against enemy shipping. They wou i i
ce similar to the concept of the fast a:;acK ra^cs dv the
vcr
: d War Two ?T boats. However :he Reagan \ciministra "* '
has not shown enthusiasm for the PHM force. In an attempt to
justify their existence, the Secretary of the Navy said that
the PHMs "add a unique capability in the increasing important
Caribbean basin, freeing up other naval assets for employment
elsewhere." [Ref. 8:p. 233 In the author's opinion, this is
the Navy's way of saying that it has not yet determined an
appropriate role, outside of coastal defense, for the
hydrofoils. This was shown several years later in
congressional testimony when the Navy was unable to state the
future role of the patrol crafts. [Ref. 8:p. 8751
Therefore, the PHMs were not an essential element in the
development of the balanced structure, and were excluded from
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the program. However, the PHMs will be evaluated in this
research since they are counted in the total ship count.
C. ATTACK SUBMARINES
Primarily tasked with anti-submarine warfare and
ant i -sh ipp i ng, the attack submarines (SS/SSN) perform many
other valuable services for the fleet. Plowing secretly
through the water, the attack submarines are extremely useful
for such clandestine operations as intelligence gathering or
minelaying. However, they are equally useful in conducting
searcn and rescue missions ana olockading moke points.
Recently, mere emphasis .a ce . ig pi ac3C -an the lse :~
3uomarir.es in direct aupocra a: oaaa.e groups ~.nc amphibious
apera z i ons
.
In testimony Defore Congress, the Navy statea that the
optimum force would consist of 131 attack submarines.
However, the force level established by Carter was 90. Under
the Reagan Administration, the force level was increased to
100 submarines to balance the expansion of the CVBGs and
amphibious ships. [Ref. 4:pp. 216 & 4611 Even though the new
goal was still far below the optimum force level, it
represented an absolute minimum which had been established in
light of budgetary constraints.
D. AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS
The amphibious ships are specifically designed to project
and support an invasion into hostile territory. Although
3^
each one of the seven different types of amphibious platforms
performs a singular integral role in the assault, the
amphibious force structure is aggregately designed to provide
a balanced projection of power. Chapter Three will go into
more detail on the role of each different platform. As for
now, it is sufficient to note that a balanced assault
requires approximately 50 amphibious ships to carry a Marine
Amphibious Force [MAF> , or approximately 20 ships to lift a
Marine Amphioicus Brigade (MAB).
The Balanced Jsrce Struccura concept: ts cleariy
demonstrated n an amphibious assau ; t . The fol lowing
scenario will dc let I y ief ine :;ie relationships. The
amphibious force .3 composed of snips which are spec 1 a
;
designee :c supper" assauits :rom the air and/or from :he
sea. For the assault, the amphibious ships are supported by
carrier battle groups CCVBG), surface action groups (SAG),
underway replenishment groups (URG), minesweepers, and attack
submarines. Enroute to the target area, the amphibious
ships, CVBGs, and SAGs are refueled and reprov i si oned by the
URG. At the same time, the URG and the amphibious ships are
defended by escort ships as shown in Tables 3 and 4.
Prior to the assault, minesweepers clear the operating
areas to be used by the amphibious ships. At the same time.
the beach is being bombarded by naval gunfire support (NGFS)
from the SAG and by air strikes from the CVBG. At a
predetermined time, the amphibious ships transit the
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mine-free lanes and launch their helicopters and landing
craft. Throughout the entire operation, attack submarines
are protecting the U.S. forces against hostile ships and
submar i nes
.
During the Carter Administration, the Navy had the
capability to lift one MAF in the event of war. However, the
Navy would have to exhaust its amphibious assets by
asseraDl ir.g tne entire amphibious force into one theater.
This would even require cne transrer of ampnibious snips
between the \tiantic and Pacific Oceans. In view of the . ;ft
capabi i i ty 1 imi cac i on . Lt . Gen . John E . M
:
:
! er , Deputy Ch 1 ef
of Staff cor ? ins. Pol icies, and Operations, cestifiea tnat
:
A reasonacie assurance (of success) force level would ce
the :apaci '. .:y to lift the assau; : eerie i en of two MAFs
simultaneously, thereoy giving /ou a capability Df a ,'iar ne
ampnibious rorce operation in eacn ocean. Since cms wouia
probably not be fiscally and realistically attainable in
the near term, an interim goal would be to have the
capability to lift an assault echelon of a Marine
amphibious force, plus a Marine amphibious brigade.
[Ref. 4:p. 290 3
The Reagan Administration supported the Department of the
Navy's opinion and incorporated the 1.5 MAF Cone MAF and one
MAB) expansion into the structure. This represented a
revived interest in amphibious warfare since 1972, when the
last amphibious ships were authorized. The amphibious force
level presented in Table 2 lists the ultimate requirements
for the 1.5 MAF lift capability.
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E. MINE WARFARE FORCES
Although often overlooked, mine warfare poses a serious
threat. It is the cheapest, easiest, and safest form of
warfare. It can be effectively employed by Third World
countries as well as developed nations. A harbor which is
mined or even suspected of being mined can paralyze shipping
and tie up essential battle assets. The recent mining of the
Suez Canal by the Libyans demonstrates how a small country
can hinder vor.a-wiae snipping. Furthermore, :ne Soviet
union realizes che value of mine warfare ana maintains the
ar-gesi stockpile of mines in the world.
The surface minesweepmg capadii ity 3r the Jnited States
Navy in L981 rested in 25 3ic minesweepers CMSQs) . Bui it in
the 1950s, the mai n t ai nab i : ity and operaoi 1 i-ty of these ships
were greatly reduced by age. Furthermore, the low priority
the Navy placed on mine countermeasures during the last ten
years had affected their mission capability. By 1981, the
techniques employed by the MSOs would counter older mines
maintained by the Soviet Union, but they were not effective
against recent mine warfare developments.
Three of the minesweepers were fully manned by active
duty crews, and the rest were assigned to the Naval Reserve
Force (NRF). The NRF minesweepers were Category B
Mobilization assets and, therefore, not counted in the Navy's
total ship count. Under President Reagan, four of the NRF
ships would be decommissioned in 1963, while the service life
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of the other 21 ships would be extended until new replacement
sh ips were bu i 1 t
.
To rebuild the surface mine countermeasure force, the
Reagan Administration pursued the development of the Avenger
Mine Countermeasures (MCM-1) class and the Cardinal
Minesweeper/Hunter (MSH-1) class. The Avenger class would
incorporate the latest state-of-the-art techniques for deep
water minehunting, mi nesweep 1 ng , and mine neutralization.
The MCM would also ce i arge enougn to deploy. The smaller
MSH would inccrporace Che same techniques as :ne MCM . our
wcu 1 a only De usea cc auc.-me.nT: the MCM in clearing ..3.
naroors ana coast: a: areas. : cccr ~: ng zc the Administration.
tne minimum force wou 1 a require 14 MCMs anc 1? MSHs . [Ret. 4:




~ q i >' ear n ~ n e ic 1 1 vg fleet ~ h
e
first eight MCMs and all of the MSHs would be transferrea to
the NRF to replace the aging minesweepers. Later, the NRF
program would be expanded to include all MCMs.
F. MOBILE LOGISTICS FORCES
Control of the sea lines of communication requires the
ability to conduct sustained operations at sea. For the
United States Navy, the ability to conduct prolonged
operations at sea is dependent on the replenishment ships and
the replenishment daisy chain.
In the daisy chain concept, illustrated in Diagram 1,
each battle group will be replenished by a mu 1 t i -product
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station ship (AOE/AOR). These ships will provide fuel,
ammunition, and stores in a one stop replenishment. This
minimizes the time a ship is alongside the replenishment
ship, and it also minimizes the vulnerability of the battle
group as a whole. The AOEs and AORs will be resupplied by
shuttle ships. The shuttle ships are the underway
replenishment groups (URGs) which are composed of
refrigeration/stores ships CAFS) , ammun : ::cn snips CAE) , ana
oilers CAO) . They shuttle the supo i : es from forward ports to
the :asK groups- The advanced ocrts wi I 1 oe resucp i ied by
macer: ai brought in oy merchant convoys.
DIAGRAM 1
MERCHANT forward CVBG
> > URG > AOE/AOR > SAG
CONVOY port MAF
The Administration's force structure calls for 15
mu 1 t i -product station ships and 10 underway replenishment
groups. The force level requirements in support of the
expanded fleet are listed in Tables 1 and 2. These
requirements are the minimum force level objectives for the
Balanced Force Structure Program. [Ref. 4:p. 464]
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G. MATERIAL/FLEET SUPPORT SHIPS
The auxiliary support ships perform a variety of
important missions which are not as glamorous as other
missions, but are still essential to the fleet. Even though
the fleet support ships are not directly involved in the
battle group, they support the fleet by conducting towing,
salvage, and submarine rescue operations. By the end of the
1970s, ocean surveillance had become a vital mission of the
fleet succor" snips.
T-AGOS snips are designed to supper: ".he mission
requirements of the surveillance ccwea array sensor
: SURTASS ) . 'on t i nuat . en or th i s crcgr am i s abso i ute 1
y
critical co :ur naintaining an anti-submarine warfare
advantage over the Soviet Navy, escec: a. iy In ight of :he
3cvi.ee Al i a ; : ass 35N ;apaci 1 . :ies. '.'. will continue co ae
a :cp Navy priori:-/. [Ref. 9:p. 30]
3y L981 , Congress lad -.pcrocc.ar.ac five I-AGOS ships.
The material support ships (AD/AS/AR) are repair tenders.
They are an i ntermedi ate- 1 eve 1 maintenance activity
responsible for enhancing the battle groups' material
readiness. They are responsible for providing repair,
maintenance, and medi ca 1 /denta 1 support to deployed
combatants. In peace or war, the mission of the material
support ships is vital to the sustai nabi
1
i ty and mobility of
the Navy's forward deployed battle groups.
Unlike the platforms previously discussed, the Reagan
Administration did not delineate the force requirements for
the material/fleet support ships. Instead, the pledge of the
Administration [Ref. iC:p. 667] was to build enough support
kO
ships to complement the build-up of the combatant forces.
Although the Navy did emphasize the ocean surveillance and
the salvage force ships in testimony before Congress, the
Navy would require a minimum of 18 T-AGOS ships. CRef. 4:pp.
469-470]
Unlike the other force level objectives, the Chief of
Naval Operations determined specific classes of ships for the
salvage force. The future salvage force would consist of
three Zdenton c ! ass salvage ana rescue ships (ATS) and. five
3olster ASR-30 class salvage ships. The 3oister c; ass wi
replace the aging ASR-38 class. [Ref. Ll:pp. 620-7281 'Since
the ASR-50 c i ass saivage snips are intended as replacements,
"hey cannot be consicerec force builders.
5
.
ice che Navy did nor. expand on the number or types or
support platforms needed for a balanced force structure, with
the exception of those already noted, the force structure
model presented in Table 2 reflects the number of material
and fleet support ships existing in the fleet in 1981.
First, the use of the numbers will facilitate the comparison
of the planned fleet to the actual fleet in succeeding
chapters. Second, the number of support ships in the fleet
in 1981 would have to be less than the minimum required to
support the expanded fleet, since the Navy stated that a
sufficient number of support ships would be built to meet
force requirements. Therefore, the use of the existing ships
*U
as a minimum in the model will not create an undue bias
against the Navy.
H. STRATEGIC SUBMARINE FORCES
The strategic submarine CSSBN) is an essential element in
the deterrence posture of the United States. Unable to be
detected, the SSBNs are considered the most survivable branch
of the strategic triad. While the immobile land-based
nuclear missiles ana the highly visible Air Force oomoers are
h i gh 1 y vu 1 nerac : e
.
Any attempted Soviet r.rst strike would eave the TRIDENT
zcrcs on station, ready to respond, ana capaDie ::
inflicting unacceptabie "?ta; :a"cr'' damage. The continued
invu i nerabi i i ty :: :ur strategic submarines is cruciai :c
our national security." [Ref. l:p. 37:
As seen n 7ac : e . , :he expansion aces lot directiy
include the strategic submarine (SSBN) force as one of the
goals for a balanced force structure. Neither does it
support the 15 carrier battle group concept. However, the
SSBN force must be considered since deterrence is a major
role of the Navy, and the SSBN force is included in counting
the 600-Ship Navy.
When presenting the proposed Balanced Force Structure
Plan to Congress, the Reagan Administration did not specify
the ultimate numerical objective for the SSBN platforms.
This was due primarily because the SSBN program was presently
undergoing significant changes. One major change was the
recent delivery of the new Ohio class SSBN, which would
1 1 r^4-2
provide a platform capable of carrying 24 launchers fitted
for the new SLBM Trident I. Furthermore, 12 of the 31 aging
Lafayette boats, equipped with 16 launchers for the Poseiaon
SLBM, would be retrofitted with the new Trident I missiles.
Finally, the change involved the conversion of eight SSBNs to
attack submarines (SSN). The eight boats were members of the
Ethan Allan and George Washington classes, and carried 16
tubes for the outdated Polaris SLBM.
In addition to the facts presented in cne orecscing
paragrapn. the Navy would also nave co consider the re. lowi ig
information in determining cne ultimate force level of :he
SSBNs. The Ch i o c : =33 submarines would eventual iy rep ice
cne Lafayette ciass. The Lafayette class was originally
Q^^g ecu i eo co c e iecomm i^sioned after 20 ?e ar s 3e r v i c e t
however, the Navy determined that their life could be
extended for another ten years. Therefore, the Lafayette
class would be active until the mid-1990s. The extension
created additional difficulties in determining the size of
the SSBN force. First, since the number of launchers varied
between the two classes, the Ohio class could not be built on
a one-for-one replacement basis. Secondly, 12 of the
ex-Poseidon boats were being converted to carry Trident I
SLBMs. Therefore, the Lafayette class would be composed of
Trioent I boats and Poseidon boats which would be in service
longer than anticipated. Also, the new force level would
have tc consider the effect of the loss of the Polaris Doats.
^3
This made it difficult for the Administration to determine
the exact number of new Ohio Trident ships to build in the
immediate future to complement or replace the remaining SSBN
force, and remain within the Strategic Arms Limitation
Treaty. Furthermore, the Navy would have to consider future
political and detente considerations, and the development of
the new Trident II, which would carry more warheads and
requ.re fewer 1 auncr.ers .
When the Balancec Force Structure program was presented
to Congress, the Mavy was unable to cea! with all the
different variaDles in determining the ultimate :or~e ?c^
for the SSBN ror~e . Chersrcre. the Administration
promuicacea a shipbuilding p i an wnicn naa oeen pursuec by the
Carter Administration. Zac'sc iaa cal led :or -icor-cr at: 3ns
for three Ohio SSBNs every two years. Unsatisfied with the
cost overruns, late deliveries, and outstanding claims in the
Ohio shipbuilding program, Congress had granted funding for
only one boat annually. The Reagan Administration had also
called for three submarines every two years beginning with
the FY 85 budget request.
Unable to gain congressional support to build three ships
per two years, the Reagan Administration conceded to one ship
per fiscal year. Therefore, since nine ships had been
previously authorized, the total number of Ohio SSBNs
appropriated by 1990 would be 17 boats.
kn-
The force goal stated in Table 2 is based on the revised
shipbuilding plan which called for 17 Ohio class SSBNs to be
active or under construction by 1989. Assuming the
construction of an SSBN is six years, there will be 11 Ohio
submarines in the fleet by the end of the decade.
Since 12 ex-Poseidon boats would be modified for the
TRIDENT I. the remaining Poseidon boats would have to be
reurea to compensate for the oncoming Ohio class. 3ecause
tnere were ten Polaris ana 3x Pose icon submarines in the
1970s, the total numoer of launchers was 556. 3asec on the
assumption that tne Administration wou i d maintain
approximately the same numoer of launchers throughout che
i980s, 1.5 Poseiaon suomarmes would nave :o oe
decommissionea cor every Ohio rrident submarine zt.ac entered
the fleet. Therefore, the force goal by 1989 would be
11-Ohio, 12-ex-Pose l don and 13-Poseidon submarines.
I . SUMMARY
President Reagan laid the foundation for the expansion of
the United States Navy. The cornerstones for the foundation
were 15 carriers; four battleships; 100 attack submarines:
1.5 MAF lift capability; and a sufficient number of support
forces. In building upon this foundation, the right mix of
platforms would have to be expanded to balance the war
fighting assets. This resulted in the development of
Reagan's Balanced Force Structure model. To achieve maritime
^5
superiority, the Navy would have to increase its number of
ships in accordance with the model.
One of the main principles which has been shown in this
chapter is the interdependence of the various task groups.
Additional carriers require additional combatants for
defense, and additional logistics ships for sustenance.
Likewise, placing more ships in the water requires more
submarine killers; therefore, additional attack submarines
anc ASW surface platforms must: ce ouilt. There ace many mere
examples, out the oasic point is that en is interconnection is
evident in al I the conventional cactie areas. LiKe a jigsaw
puzz ; e . if a piece ls missing then :he oaianced cores
structure is not comp 1 ?cs.
m
The final point to note in "his chapter is that :r,e -tree
structure model represents a minimum force level to regain
superiority. As seen throughout the chapter, the Navy cannot
build an optimum force level primarily because of budgetary
constraints. Therefore, the force model is extremely
stringent. This has strong implications for the Navy. If
the shipbuilding program in a ship category is delayed,
reduced, or cancelled so that tne ship category does not meet
the minimum level established in the model, then other task




BUILDING THE FORCE STRUCTURE DURING THE 1980s
As seen in the last chapter, there is an important
interrelationship of the different ship categories which must
be considered in planning the force structure. This is quite
evident in the development of the model of the Balanced Force
Structure promoted by the Navy under President Reagan. The
mode i provides the gu i oe 1 ines ~o promote the expansion of the
fleet wh , '. e controlling force equilibrium.
Tao I s 5 compares ".ne force Structure Mcoe ! against the
Summary of J.S. .Java: forces in i'^Bi . This axo i Lcitly shows
that it wou » a rscxuir? a massive cui!d-up to achieve the
number of sr.i.os advocated oy the mooes . Since the L980s
would witness one of the most aggressive expansions of the
Navy during peacetime, the execution of the shipbuilding
programs would be extremely important in determining the
successful achievement of the balanced force. This would be
especially important in light of the magnitude of the
expansion and the potential impact of future budgetary
constraints.
Therefore, this chapter will examine how the Reagan
Administration planned on expanding the fleet and what
actually happened up to 1986. Based upon this information
and the shipbuilding time assumptions presented in
^7
TABLE 5
COMPARISON OF THE SUMMARY OF U.S. NAVAL FORCES
IN 1981 WITH THE BALANCED FORCE STRUCTURE MODEL
Number of Ships
Ship Type OBJECTIVE 1981
Battle Forces
Aircraft Carriers CCV/CVN)-depl oyabl e 15 12
Surface Combatants
Battleships (3B)
Cruisers guided missile (CG/CGN)
Destroyers (DD) *
Destroyers guided missile <DDG)
Fr: ga-es (FF/FFG) a
Attack Sucmar: nes (SS/3SN)





Assau 1 c Transport <LKA;
Landing Ship Transport (LST) *
Helo Assault Ship (LHA)
Helo Transport Ship (LPH)
General Purpose Assault <LHD)
Landing Ship Dock (LSD)
Dock Transport (LPD)
Subtotal, Amphibious 74 65
Mine Warfare Ships
Minesweepers (MSO) 3
Mine Countermeasures (MCM) 14
Minehunters (MSH) 17































Stores Ship ( AFS/TAFS/TAF)
Subtotal, Replenishment
Total , Battle Forces
Support Forces
Material Support Ships
Destroyer Tender CAD) 9 9
Submarine Tender (AS) 3 8
Repair Ship CAR) 4 4
SSBN SUPPORT (AS/TAX) 5 6
Subtotal








Total , Support Forces
Strategic Submarine Forces
Ohio Class Trident (SSBN)
Lafayette Trident (SSBN)
Lafayette Poseidon (SSBN)
Benjamin Franklin Polaris (SSBN)
Total, Strategic Forces
Total , U.S. Naval Forces















Chapter One, the force structure will be developed for 1989.
Although, one of the ultimate objectives is to determine
whatthe Summary of the U.S. Naval Forces will be in 1989,
any future funding after FY 86 will not be significant for
this chapter since ships appropriated after FY 86 would not
enter the fleet until the early 1990s.
The data used to examine the history came primarily from
the Janets Fighting Ships series. The aata sheets used to
assimilate the information are presented in Appendixes G-N,
while a condensed version is presented in TaDle 5 for easy
reference ana comparison.
A. FORCE DEVELOPMENT
1. - i r c r ^ f t Cdf" ^r
;
The Aami n i strat i en caiiec :or an ..Timeai ace Du^.d-up
of the 15 carrier force. In 1981, there were 12 deployable
carriers and two ships under construction. The USS CARL
VINSON (CVN-70) had been appropriated in the early 1970s and
would be in the fleet by 1982. After an intense battle with
the Carter administration, The USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT
CCVN-71) had been appropriatea in FY 80, but would not be
completed until 1986. Because the two carriers undergoing
construction would not expand the force, the Reagan
Administration planned on using other methods to expand the
number of battle groups by 1984. In the short run, the
Administration planned on returning the USS CORAL SEA CCV-43)
50
TABLE 6





Ship Type 1981 1986 1989
Battle Forces
Aircraft Carriers < CV )-dep I oyab i e 9 9 9
Muc : ear Carriers (CVN) 3 5 5
Subtotal 12 14 . -.
Surrace Cornea can "3
3atz i esn i os . 3B;
^ru.sers guided nissi le- <CG) ,3
Nuc bruisers guicea missiie ( CCN
)
9
Suczoza: , CC/CGN 27 33 46
Des-r-^vers DD) 43 31
3
Destroyers guiaeo missile (DDG) 39 37 38




Patrol Craft Combatants (PG/PHM)
Submar i nes
Attack Submarines CSS)




Command Ship ( LCC)
Assault Transport CLKA)
Landing Ship Transport CLST)















Helo Transport Ship <LPH)
General Purpose Assault (LHD)


















Succota i , Mine 19
Replenishment Ships
Stan ion Ship 'AOE)
Stat i on Sh i p ' ACR
)




























































TOTAL, STRATEGIC FORCES 33 36 35




Frigates guided missile :FFG)
Amphibious Warfare Ships
Landing Ship Transport CLST)
TOTAL, CATEGORY \
TOTAL, U.S. NAVAL FORCES
* Not countec in Navy's :ocai sn^p count. The ship counc
for 1989 is based on the following assumptions. The MCMs and
MSHs, which were funded by FY 86, will be operational and
will relieve the NRF MSOs on one-for-one basis.
*# The number of ships in 1989 is based on the following
assumptions. If the two AOs and the 11 TAOs are
decommissioned at their 40 year mark, of which the two AOs
and five of the TAOs have already passed, then the number of
AO/TAO should be 13 in 1989. If the older ones remain in the
fleet then the total will be 26. The number 18 above is
based on the assumption that the older ones will be replaced
on a one-for-one basis. Therefore, of the 18 in 1989, five
will be of the new Cimarron class, seven of the HJK class,








to deployable status and on reactivating the USS ORISKANY
(CV-34). The ORISKANY was a World War Two vintage carrier
which had been decommissioned in 1976. The ORISKANY would
have a very limited role since she was too small to carry the
Navy's most modern warplanes. Also, the Administration
planned on delaying the retirement of the MIDWAY and the
LEXINGTON. Even though the LEXINGTON was not a combatant and
not counted in the total numDer of carriers, if she were
aecommi ssi oned, a aeployaoie carrier wou i a have to replace
her. under Reagan's ? i an , the Navy would have L4 carriers by
the miaale of FY 34. which does net include the carrier
undergoing 5LZ? .
As the plan oeve:opec. the service lives of the CORAL
SEA, MIDWAY, ana LEXINGTON were ixzancsa. An air wing was
established for the CORAL SEA and the CARL VINSON was active
by 1982. However, the reactivation of the ORISKANY received
a heavy broadside attack from Congress. Facing strong
opposition from the Senate Armed Services Committee and the
Appropriation Committee from both houses, the request for the
ORISKANY was scuttled seven months after it had been
proposed. [Ref. 12:p. 3153
Even though the Administration did not meet its goal
of 15 carriers by 1984, it was instrumental in reaching 14
deployable carriers by 1986. The force level was achieved
only by the extension of the service lives of three carriers,
and the refitting of the CORAL SEA. Furthermore, the Navy
5^
received appropriation for two more nuclear carriers in the
FY 83 budget, which was an amazing feat considering that the
future of the carrier was uncertain only three years earlier.
Since the additional ships will not be delivered until the
1990s and there are no immediate plans to decommission any
carriers, the Navy will end this decade with a 14 deployable
carrier battle force. This count does not include the ship
undergoing SLEP and the LEXINGTON.
2. Ba~ t . ssn
.
os
The final reactivation of the battleship force was a
product of the Heacan Administration. The Navy previously
at;=mpr.3c to obtain the runes to re-ccmmi ssi on the US3 NEW
JERSEY in - 2 8G . ana even received the approval zrem the T\
1981 Authorization 3i 1 1 . However, che Senate ;enemen:
argued that expenditures for an old battleship could more
effectively be used elsewhere, and funding was never granted.
CRef. 13:p. 195]
When President Reagan announced his program to
rebuild the fleet, the battleship became an integral
component for the Expansion Program, and the Navy received
the needed congressional support. The Navy planned to
reactivate four Iowa class battleships, which would serve as
the centerpiece for the four surface action groups (SAGs)
proposed in the build-up. The battleship was also justified
on the grounds that it would fill the defense gap until the
55
15 carrier battle groups were in service in the mid-1990s.
CRef. 12:p. 204]
As can be seen from the Appendixes, the
Administration planned on funding the battleships in the next
four fiscal years. The NEW JERSEY, IOWA, MISSOURI, and
WISCONSIN would be funded in FY 82, FY 83, FY 84, and FY 85
respectively. All reactivated battleships would be in the
fleet no later than 1987. This aggressive goal would require
advancea funding to stay on schedule.
The FY 31 Supplemental and the FY 82 Appropriation
Bi 1 is granted the runes -o re-ccmmi ssi en the USS NEW JERSEY
' 3S--52: and to ouy oar*:s in advance tor the reactivation of
the USS IOWA (3B-61). As planned, full funding was granted
in the FY 33 :cr the USS IOWA: however, the 3enac^ refused :o
grant the funds needed for the advanced procurement of
components to be used in the modernization of the USS
MISSOURI (BB-63). CRef. 14:p. 280 3 This delay made the
future for the remaining two battleships look dreary, as
demonstrated in the constant rescheduling of the MISSOURI and
WISCONSIN during the next three fiscal years (Appendixes
C-E) .
Undaunted by the heavy seas created by Congress, the
Navy used funds generated by contract savings to fully fund
the reactivation of the USS MISSOURI in FY 85. The Navy used
the congressional support, fueled by their determination, to
receive full funding for the USS WISCONSIN during the next
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fiscal year. CRef. 2:p. 193 By late 1986, three battleships
were back in service, with the delivery of the fourth and
final battleship scheduled within the next two years.
3. Cruiser Guided Missile/Nuclear Cruiser Missile
The Balance Force Structure Program called for 33
cruisers (CG/CGN) to operate in a high threat area and to
provide area defense for the battle group against air,
surface, and submarine threats. In 1981, the force consisted
of 27 guided missile cruisers. Sigr.teen cr the cruisers were
steam powered ships built: during che mid-sixties. The
remaining nine snips were nuclear and varied in age. Six
snips in me Virginia ana California classes had seen built
in the iate i^70s, while :he other three nuclear cruisers
were ou: I ~ in the ear: ; L °60s. tfi th the last Dt the nuc.iear
cruisers completed in 1978, the U.S. Navy began building the
Ticonderoga (CG-47) class guided missile cruiser. The lead
ship entered the fleet in 1983. This ship class has greatly
increased the anti-air warfare capability and survivability
of the cruiser force. Equipped with the new Aegis system,
this class was designed to counter the anti-ship missile
threat of a high density environment. It is capable of
simultaneously detecting several hundred targets and
intercepting over a dozen incoming high speed missiles. CRef.
6:pp. 90-1061
Since the cruisers (CG/CGN) built in the 1960s will
be retired in the 1^90s, the Ticonderoga class will
5?
eventually serve as replacements and as the core of the
cruiser force. [Ref. 15:p. 108 3 The Admi n i strat ion'
s
balanced force structure requires a total of 27 Aegis
cruisers, of which 19 have been procured. In 1986, there
were six ships in commission, and 13 under construction.
Based on an average shipbuilding time of four years,
there will be 19 CG-47s in commission by the end of the
decade
.
4 . Destrovers/Destrovers Guiaea :1 i ss i i 8
The destroyer fleet would nave to oe increased to
fulfill the adoit.cnai requirements created oy the increased
numoer of carriers: formation or rour new SAGs; inc the
expansion of ampn.oicus ana support forces. The oaiancec
force program :a. ted for it least 37 destroyers CDD) tna -67
guided missile destroyers (DDG). In 1981, shortly after the
promulgation of the Fleet Expansion Program, the Navy had
nine Naval Reserve Force (NRF) destroyers, 43 DDs and 39
DDGs. Even though it appeared that there would not have to
be much of a build-up to meet the Navy's goals, many of the
ships were outdated and ready for retirement. The following
sections will illustrate tne development of the destroyer
navy through the Recovery Program.
Although the opinion is generally accepted that the
destroyer ( DD or DDG) is the work horse of the fleet and is
tasked with all warfare missions, there is a distinction
between the destroyer and the guided missile destroyer. The
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DDG carries guided missiles for anti-air warfare, whereas the
DDs lean towards anti-submarine warfare platforms.
Therefore, the DD is not altogether interchangeable with the
DDG. Because of this distinction, the destroyers will be
treated separately from the guided missile destroyer.
The destroyer force consisted of 13 Forrest Sherman
class DDs and 30 Spruance class DDs. The Forrest Sherman
class ships were built in the 1950s and were nearing
retirement. Their primary mission was originally anti-air
warfare, du* had ceen changed to naval gunfire support
oecause of the technological aevelopmenc of air wartare since
the 1950s. The..- armament ccnsistea of three gun mounts md
six ;or?eco tubes: however, several or ;ne snips had ceen
iicOiriea with the installation of an anti-submarine rocKe.t
(ASROC) launcher. There were five other Forrest Shermans
which were not counted in the DD force, since four of the
Shermans were previously converted to guided missile
destroyers and the other ship was transferred to the NRF in
1980. These ships will be discussed later.
To supplement and eventually replace the aging
destroyers, the Spruance class destroyer was developed during
the 1970s. The Spruance class, armed with modern
anti-submarine rockets and anti-ship missiles, was also
intended primarily for anti-submarine and anti-surface
warfare. Congress had fully appropriated all 31 Spruance
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destroyers by the middle of the 1970s, and by 1981, 30 were
in commission.
The Forrest Sherman class was expected to remain in
the fleet until the middle of the decade. However, in 1982,
Congress approved a plan to retire the 13 Forrest Sherman
destroyers ahead of schedule. This action, in conjunction
with the retirement of four converted Forrest Sherman DDGs
and five oi the oldest amphibious ships, would save the
government $123.2 million dollars. This was in contrast w th
the authorization bi 1 I which haa retired only the 13
destroyers. [Ref. L4:p. 288] Around the same time that t.^e
final Spruance ::ass destroyer antered tne fleet m L983, the
JSS MULLINNIX (DD-944) , the i ast great Forrest. Sherman gun
sn,p" was decommissioned. As seen in Appenaixes A-F , 'he
Reagan Administration did not plan on building any more DDs.
This can be explained by two reasons. First, the
Administration was promoting the development of the DDGX, an
experimental guided missile Aegis destroyer which was later
designated as the Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class. Second, the
balanced force structure required more destroyers with
anti-air warfare capability since many of the current DDGs
were nearing retirement. Therefore, the total number of
destroyers (DDs) would remain at 31 throughout tne rest of
the decade
.
In 1980, the USS EDSON (DD-946). a Forrest Sherman
c i ass destroyer, was transferred to the NRF . This brought
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the total number of NRF destroyers to 9 in 1981. Although
the EDSON was not decommissioned with the other Forrest
Shermans in 1983, the other eight NRF destroyers were
decommissioned in the next few years. The EDSON, the only
NRF DD still in commission, is included in the total ship
count since it is a Mobilization Category A ship.
In 1981, the guided missile destroyer CDDG) fcr~e
consisted mostly of snips which were nearing their retirement
age. Dn 1 y two of "he 39 ships vere recent aodi": ens to the
f:eet. Of the remaining 37 ships, four were convert 3a
Forrest Sherman :;ass DDGs. and the rest were memoers zr. the
aging DDG-2 Cocntz ano the DDG-37 Aaams z i asses
.
The two new recent additions were nemcers zz the Kidd
CDDG-993) c i ass . This snip was bu i i t on a Spruance hull, cue
was modified for guided missiles. Four ships of this class
were originally ordered by the pro-American Iranian
government. After the Iranian conflict, the U.S. government
procured the contracts for the four ships. The U.S. Navy
does not plan on building any more Kidd class DDGs.
In 1982, the final two Kidd class destroyers entered
the fleet, which increased the force size to 41 guided
missile destroyers. However, a year later, the four Forrest
Sherman modified DDGs were decommissioned, which brought the
total down to 37 DDGs. There will be no more further gains
or losses until 1989.
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Prior to the Reagan Administration, plans were being
developed for a new class of guided missile destroyer (DDGX).
This class, later designated the Arleigh Burke class, would
incorporate the new phased array radar which can acquire many
air contacts simultaneously. This destroyer would be a
complement to the Aegis cruiser, and would balance the Reagan
Administration's proposed force structure. The lead ship was
fully funded in FY 1985 with an expected completion Gate of
1989. As seen in Appendixes D-F. the Administration plannea
an aggressive shipbuilding schedule for the :ss: of the
class. The Navy cians to build a "ocai af 29 Arleigh 3ur:<e
class guided missile destroyers. However. :.nese ships wi 1
not be force builders since they will be essentially a
sne-for-one replacement rcr the 3ocncz anc Acams :: asses,
which will begin retirement during the 1990s. CRef. 16:
p. 6543
5. Frigates/Frigates Guided Missile
The frigate/frigate guided missile (FF/FFG) force in
1981 consisted of a total of 66 ships. This was a far cry
from the 101 frigates needed to complement the balanced force
structure. However, there were 114 convoy escorts within the
next five years. This growth was essentially accomplished by
budget appropriation prior to the Reagan Administration, and
was primarily the result of Congressional pressure to
rejuvenate the convoy escort force.
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There were 59 fast frigates (FF) in 1981. These
ships were built during the late 1960s and the early 1970s,
and would be operational until the late 1990s. Equipped with
ASROC launchers and helicopters, the fast frigates were
primarily designed for anti-submarine warfare. With the
exception of two gun mounts, the fast frigates did not have a
modern hard kill weapon system for anti-air warfare.
In an effort to rebu i ' d the NRF . eight frigates were
transferred to the NRF MoDilization Category A Force since
1981. CRef. l:p. 34 j Since there are no present plans to
ou : i d , decommission or transfer any nore or the FFs, the
zee a; .lumoer of snips in . 389 will :e 51 acti.ve frigates and
eigne NRF frigates.
In aaci'ion t 3 the 7Fs. :here were six shios of che
FFG-1 Brooke class in commission in 1981. Armed with an
ASROC launcher, the Brooke class also carried a
surface-to-air missile launcher. This provided the convoy
with anti-submarine protection, as well as an area defense
system. The FFG-1 class was built during the late 1960s and
would remain operational until the late 1990s.
The rapid growth in the escort force during the 1980s
came from the FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry class. The Perry
class represented a departure from the previous role of the
frigates and guided missile frigates. Like the Brooke class,
the FFG-7 was specifically built to supplement the open-ocean
air defense of the convoy escorts. However, the Perry
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class as a far greater anti-air and anti-surface warfare
capability than the previous classes. Furthermore, the Perry
class was also different from the other escorts in that the
FFG-7 had a reduced anti-submarine warfare capability.
Unlike the other FFs and FFGs, the Perry class does not carry
an ASROC launcher.
Ever since the lead ship first entered the fleet in
1977, Congress took a special interest in the FFG-7 program.
This was partial iy aue co the well-roundea warfare capability
of the FFG-73. and the zesire to improve the NRF
.
Unsatisfied with the Navy's orcposai to ou 1 I a a frigace (FFX)
(shown :n Apcencix A; :cr :he ,>IRF . Congress strcngiy
recommenaec that the Navy build .ncre fFG-7s ana 'ransrer the
oicier ones to the <eser"es. [Ref. '.2:c. 1891 In ccmpl iancs
with congressional desires, the Navy dropped the FFX program
and planned on building 51 ships. Eighteen of the FFG-7s
were scheduled to be transferred to the NRF.
By 1981, Congress had authorized a total of 45 ships.
[Ref. 4:p. 5263 During the next few years, the last six
ships were ahead of the Navy's schedule. [Ref. 17:p. 195]
After the last ship was appropriated in FY 84,
Congress pressed the Navy to develop a guided missile frigate
which would be equipped with an Aegis type radar.
[Ref. 18: p. 482] However, the Navy halted all research for
a new guided missile frigate in 1986, because all the design
6k
options called for a ship which would be bigger than the
newest class of guided missile destroyers. CRef . 15:p. 108]
Therefore, the convoy escort shipbuilding program
came to a conclusion. The final count of FFG-7s in 1986 was
40 ships in commission, nine transferred to the NRF, and two
undergoing construction. The last two ships will be
completed by 1988, and the other nine FFG-7s will eventually
be transferred by 1989.
6 . Attack Submarines
To immeaiateely expedite the growth in the SSN
forces, che Reagan Administration continued the conversion o-
eigne strategic submarines (SSBN) into attacx submarines.
These SSBNs were oeing phased out oy the introcuction or the
new Ch i o class strategic submarines into the fleet.
The ex-SSBN conversion increased the force numbers
but only for a short period. Converted from 1980 to 1982,
six of the eight ex-SSBNs served for approximately two to
three years and then were decommissioned. The short life
span of the ex-SSBNs was based on the fact that the ex-SSBN
could not perform like an SSN. Designed differently, the
ex-SSBNs were larger, noisier, slower, and less effective.
[Ref. 19:p. 663 By the end of 1984, all ex-SSBNs were
retired except for two boats which were converted to troop
transports to replace one aging diesel submarine. The
ex-SSBN troop transports will operate throughout the 1990s.
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In 1981, the Navy had 79 attack submarines. Of this
total, five of the submarines were diesel boats, six were
ex-SSBNs, and the rest were SSNs. The most recent class of
submarines was the Los Angeles SSN-688 class. With 11 boats
in the fleet and 26 under construction by 1981, the SSN-688
class was and would be the only class to be built from 1975
to 1991. Twenty-three of the boats under construction would
enter the fleet between 1981 and 1986.
With the addition of the 23 SSN-688 c i ass submarines
and two ex-SSBNs, and the retirement of six ex-SSBNs anc
1-SS, the Navy had 97 attacK submarines in 1986. As
previously notea. 26 suomarmes were appropriated prior :o
the Reagan Administration. Upon the commissioning or :ne
> ast three boats appropriated oy previous administrations
within the next year, the Navy would have over 100
submarines. Therefore, the expansion must partially be
attributed to previous administrations. However, the
sustainment of the goal must be attributed to the Reagan
Administration. According to the Navy, the 100 ship goal
could be maintained only with the appropriation of three to
four ships annually, which was a departure from past
practices in the 1970s. CRef. 4:p. 4613 As seen in
Appendixes A-F, the Reagan Administration gradually increased
the annual budget requests to four ships by FY 86. The Navy
hopes to continue the rate of building three to four ships
throughout the rest of the century.
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In 1986, 18 SSN-688 class boats were under
construction, of which ten will enter the fleet by 1989.
This will increase the total number of boats to 108.
Assuming that the submarines will be decommissioned at the
end of their 30 years of service, four Skate class submarines
<SSN) will be decommissioned by the end of the decade.
Therefore, the Navy will have 103 battle force attack
submarines by 1989.
In adaition to the increased procurement of
submarines, ".he Mavy was also granted funding to develop a
new submarine class. The lew Seawoif SSN-21 : : ass nas :een
designee to counter :he present i.na future Soviet submarine
threat. Ful I production ^r the Seawolf class is scheduled to
begin in FY ?i.. Since this :: i:ss .3 _nr.3P.cea to rep i ice an
older class, it will not be a force builder.
7. Amphibious Warfare
In 1981, the Marine Corps had the personnel and
equipment to simultaneously conduct two MAF assaults in two
different theaters, but were limited by the transportation
capacity of the Navy. With barely enough assets to lift only
one MAF, the Navy would have to assemble all its amphibious
ships into one ocean. Even under peacetime conditions, the
Navy was hard pressed to meet its commitments to continuously
deploy three Marine Amphibious Units. Under the program to
regain maritime superiority, the number of amphibious ships-
would be increased to support a MAF and a MAB, granting the
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United States the ability to concurrently project power into
hostile territory in two different oceans.
In expanding the amphibious force, the Navy was also
faced with the impending retirement of over half of the Dock
Landing Ships (LSD) in the 1980s, and the block obsolescence
of the remaining amphibious force in the 1990s. CRef. 4:
p. 7683 In total, 60 of the 65 amphibious ships in
commission in 1981 wou i d reach retirement age by the year
2000. Therefore, :he Navy wou i c -lave :o program replacements




oefore 1989, it is going to build the S0C-5h;p Navy ana after
.
CC?Q . : -3 i mainta.iner 3f :he 500 ship sountJ . ' !Ref... 16:
p. 6433 Using this rule of thumb, the Navy used two programs
to expand the amphibious force and two other programs to
maintain the force. These programs will be discussed in the
following appropriate sections,
a. Command Ships
The USS BLUE RIDGE CLCC-19) and the USS MOUNT
WHITNEY (LCC-20) are the only ships constructed specifically
for the amphibious warfare command and control. These two
ships were built in the early 1970s and will remain in
commission until the turn of the century. The Reagan
Administration has not promulgated any future shipbuilding
plans for this category of ship.
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b. Amphibious Cargo Ships
The five Charleston class cargo ships (LKA) were
specifically designed to carry heavy equipment and material
for the amphibious assault, and has limited capability to
transport troops. The five ships were built from 1968 to
1970. Based on a 30 year life span, they will remain in
service until the turn of the century. The Reagan
Administration has not promulgated any future shipbuilding
plans for this category of ship.
c. Tank Landing Ships
The tank landing ship CLST) transports tanks ana
other vehicles used in the assau ": t . This is the only ship in
the NIavy which deliberately "beaches" itself. When a
beachhead has been sstabl ished, the LST connects a -amp.
which extends from its bow to causeways running to the beach.
Thereby, tanks and other heavy vehicles are offloaded.
In 1981, there were 20 Newport class LSTs , of
which two of the ships were later assigned to the NRF. These
ships were commissioned in a four year span beginning in
1969. They also have a 30 year service life and will be
operational until 2000. No more ships of this category are
scheduled in the near future.
d. Amphibious Assault Ships
Principally a helicopter carrier for air assault,
the amphibious assault ships (LHA) also have well decks for
amphibious landing craft and tractors. In launching the
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landing crafts, the well decks are flooded and the troop
landing crafts escape to the sea for their assault onto the
beach. The LHA combines the features of the LPH helicopter
carriers with the well decks of the LSDs , enabling the LHAs
to conduct airborne and seaborne assaults. There are five
ships in this category which are recent additions to the
fleet. Since the design of the LHA is being used in the
development of the new general purpose amphibious assault
ship (LHD), no more LHAs will be constructed. The LHAs will
reach their 30 year life span around 2008.
e. Helicopter Assault Shi?
The helicopter assau I z ships (LPHs) are
helicopcer carriers aesignec to project: aerial assaults. The
same size as wor ; a War Two aircrart carriers, the IPHs are
the first platforms ever constructed to specifically employ
helicopters in the assault role. Being the forerunners of
the LHAs, the LPHs are smaller and are not capable of
carrying amphibious landing craft. Built during the 1960s,
the seven Iwo Jima class LPHs would serve as one of the
mainstays of the amphibious force until they reach block
obsolescence during the 1990s.
f. Mu 1 t i -Purpose Amphibious Assault Ship
The multi-purpose assault ship (LHD) is one of
the programs promulgated by the Reagan Administration to
expand the fleet's capabilities. The LHD incorporates the
features of the LPH and the LHA, while adamg its own new
70
dimensions to the amphibious warfare. Like the LPH and LHA,
the LHD will employ helicopters in aerial assault, but the
LHD's flight deck will also support the Marine's Harrier
V/STOL (vertical/short takeoff and land) aircraft. The LHD
can also be converted into a V/STOL aircraft carrier for sea
control and tactical air support. CRef. 6:p. 100] The LHD is
also designed to carry the new high speed air cushion landing
craft (LCAC)
.
The Navy plans on ouiiding a total of 12 LHDs.
Five ships wi 1 i oe used to augment the fleet's lift
capaoi 1 i t ies, while the other seven ships will replace the
aging LPHs en a one-for-one oasis. [Ret. ll:p. 688:
The first two snips of the class were
appropriated n FY 34 ana FY 86. The USS WASP (LHD-1), the
lead ship, will enter the fleet in 1989, while the second
ship is scheduled to be commissioned in 1991. CRef. 2:p. 40]
g. Dock Landing Ship
The dock landing ship (LSD) was the first
category of ships to have the well deck, and thereby was the
forerunner for the LHA, LHD and LPD. Principally designed to
carry cargo and landing craft, the LSDs also have removable
helicopter decks.
By 1981, there were 13 LSDs in the fleet. Eight
of the ships belonged to the Thomaston (LSD-28) class, which
were scheduled for retirement in the 1980s. CRef. 8: p. 768]
The remaining five LSDs (Anchorage LSD-36 class)
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were built in the early 1970s and would be operational until
the turn of the century.
In the late 1970s, the Navy proposed a new class
of LSDs to replace the Thomaston class. The Carter
Administration rejected the proposal, but submitted to
congressional pressure to retain the lead ship, USS WHIDBEY
ISLAND (LSD-41), in the FY 81 budget request. [Ref. 6:p. 1003
Likewise, Congress approonated the funas to build the second
ship in the LSD-41 class, even tnough it had nc: been
requested in Reagan-' s FY 32 buaget request. [Ref. 12 :p. 22° '.
Thereat tar . an aaai r. icnai sni.c -see . vea funding unci! FY 36.
when runes were appropriated for the i as: two snips.
Thereafter, the Reagan Administration supported the LSD-41
program ana .ncluded ft in ".he shipbuilding ? : an . By .986, a
total of eight ships were appropriated to replace the LSD-28
on a one-for-one basis.
From FY 83 to FY 86, the Navy was undecided about
the total number of Whidbey Island ships the Navy wanted.
The FY 83 FYSBP, (Appendix B) projected eight more LSD-41
class ships, which meant that the total number of ships in
the class was increased to ten. In the next FYSBP, (Appendix
C) with the tnree ships under construction, the total was
increaseed to 12 ships. This number was reduced in the next




In the FY 87 FYSBP , four modified LSD-41 ships
were proposed, which ships will be a smaller version of the
original class. Although the LSD-41 (Variant) will expand
the dock landing ship force, the proposed platform was
originally intended to replace the experimental LPD (LPDX),
proposed by the Administration in the FY 85 Shipbuilding
Program (Appendix D). [Ref. 6:p. 100]
By 1986, the two WHIDBEY ISLAND (LSD-41) were
active, and five ships of the L3D-28 class were
aecommi ssi onea. Ail eigne LSD-41 ships wi 1 : nave replaced
the eigne L5D-2Ss by 1989. If the LSD-41 (Variant) receives
funding as scnecuiec, :ne first; one will not enter :he r.aec
before :992.
h. Landing Platform Dcc:<
The amphibious transport docks (LPD) are similar
to the dock landing ship (LSD), except the LPDs have extra
space for additional troops and cargo. Furthermore, The LPDs
have permanent helicopter decks, and are especially suited
for tracked vehicles. [Ref. 5:p. 134]
There were 13 LPDs in two different classes in
1981. Two of the ships were in the Raleigh class and the
rest were in the Austin class. Both classes of ships were
built during the 1960s and would reach retirement age during
the 1990s. In anticipation of the block obsolescence, the
Reagan Administration planned on developing a platform (LPDX)
which would be similar in size ana load characteristics as
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the ongoing LSD-41 ship program. As previously stated, the
LPDX program was subsequently dropped, and four ships which
were a modified version of the LSD-41 would be pursued. The
four LSD-41 (Variant) ships would replace the Raleigh class.
Funds for the first ship would be requested in FY 88.
Initially, the LPDX was going to replace both the Raleigh and
the Austin classes. Since the LPDX program was dropped, and
the Raleigh LPDs were going to be replaced by LSD-41
variants, the Reagan Administration piannea en extending the
service lives of the remaining ii snips. The Austin LPD-4
class wcu i c undergo a 3LEP similar co the a.rcrart carriers.
The SLEP would extend the life at the LPDs to 45 years,
modernize their engineering piants, and incorporate aectar
self protection systems. [Ref. 2C;o. 29.. However, funding
for the SLEP has been continuously delayed since the plan was
first proposed, as seen in Appendixes C-F. In FY 84,
Congress rejected the SLEP and in FY 85, the Navy never
obligated the funds which were granted. [Ref. 20 :p. 404]
Under current plans, the Navy will again request advance
funds in the FY 87 budget request.
By 1986, the number of LPDs in the fleet was
still the same number as in 1981. Furthermore, there would
not be any additions or deletions throughout the rest of the
decade. The modified LSD-41 class could not enter the fleet
prior to the early 1990s, and the two ships of the Raleigh
7^
class would not be decommissioned until they reached the end
of their useful service life in the mid-1990s.
8. Mine Countermeasures
Since the minesweepers <MSOs), as seen in Chapter
Two, were quickly decaying, the Administration promoted an
aggressive plan to rebuild the mine countermeasure force.
The plans to build the new 14 mine countermeasure (MCM) ships
called for total funaing by FY 87 (Appendix B). Likewise,
totaj funding for tne 17 Cardinal minehunters ships wou 1 a oe
complete by FY 88 (Appendix C). Basec on a construction time
of tnree years, the new snips wou 1 a be completed by the end
of tne cecace . CRef. 4: pp. 528-529;
However, tne shipbuilding programs quickly ran into
be i ays. The first delay came from Congress. In the FY 33
budget, the House of Representatives refused to grant funding
for the next four Avenger class ships. Their argument was
that not enough work had been completed on the lead ship,
appropriated in FY 82, to justify additional procurement.
However, the Conference Committee did finally approve funding
for one mine countermeasure ship. CRef. 14:p. 281] This was
the only delay caused by Congress, and for the next few years
Congress consistently approved the number of MCMs and MSHs
requested by the Navy.
With the passage of the FY 86 budget, Congress had
appropriated funding for a total of 11 MCMs and five MSHs.
However, the Navy had awarded only five contracts for the
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MCMs, because problems in the design had surfaced and created
costly delays. In building the USS AVENGER CMCM-1), the
delivery date was postponed from 1985 to 1986. After
construction had begun, the Navy determined that the hull
would have to be extended an additional 17 feet to house new
equipment and maintain buoyancy. Problems were further
discovered in the reduction gears, engine rotation, and the
newly developed navigation system. Also, under the present
design tne snip cou i a not: meet cne electromagnetic
interference criteria estaolishea oy the Navy. An additional
$97 mil iion was apprcpr i atec in FY 36 to cover the growtn in
program cost. [Ref. 21 :p. ~54J
In anticipation that ail prcDiems will ce correcteo
ana no further problems ire incurred, tne Navy plans en
awarding contracts in groups of three ships. For the last
six ships funded, the contracts will be awarded in FY 86 and
FY 87. The contract for the last three ships, which are not
yet funded, will be awarded in FY 88. CRef. 20 :p. 355]
The MSH program has also suffered delays. Five ships
were fully funded by 1986; however, only one ship was under
construction. The lead ship was appropriated in FY 84 and
was expected to enter the fleet by 1988. The last four ships
were funded in FY 86 with an estimated time of completion
scheduled for 1990. However, the MSH has experienced many
problems, including cracks in the glass-reinforced plastic
hull. Full production on the lead ship under construction
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has been halted, and contracts for the other four ships will
not be submitted until the structural and technical risks are
resolved. As seen in Appendix F, the Navy still intends on
requesting the funds for the rest of the 12 ships.
For the purpose of this thesis, the assumption is
that all problems will be corrected and that all MCMs and
MSHs, which up to this time have been funded, will be
operational by 1989. However, the assumption is made that
aii MSCs will oe replacea on a one-for-one oasis and the NRF
ships will oe cne first to oe decommissi cnec. TaDie 6
reflects these assumptions.
? . Mobile Logistics Support Force - Pep i en i shment
Sh i ps
a. Fast Combat Support Ship/Replenishment ji;er
The Fast Scmcac Support Ship CADE) anc the
Replenishment Oiler (AOR) are the "station ships" which
provide "one stop shopping" capability for the task groups.
Their ability to simultaneously provide fuel, ammunition,
dry, and refrigerated stores allows the battle group to
replenish in a minimal amount of time. This reduces the
vulnerability of the battle group while keeping it forward
deployed. The fast speed of the AOE and the AOR was
specifically designed to allow them to directly operate with
the combatant forces.
Four AOEs and seven AORs were active in the fleet
when the balanced force structure was proposed. The AOEs
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were built in the 1960s, while the newer AORs were built in
the late 1960s through the early 1970s. Since the expected
service life of the station ships is 30 years, the AOEs and
AORs will reach retirement age from the mid-1990s through to
the turn of the century. [Ref. 8:p. 766]
Even though the Navy recognized a shortfall in
the number of mu 1 t i -product ships as early as 1978, the
Carter Administration did not implement a shipbuilding
program no increase the number of AOEs and AORs. [Ref. 3:p.
56] A fifth AOE was tentatively scheauled for the FY 30
budget, out was eventually deleiea.
As seen in tne Five Year ShipDuiiding Plans in
Appenaixes A-F, new AORs nave not oeen scneauled curing the
Reagan Administration. On the other nana, funding for the
lead AOE was to be requested in FY 85 according to the FY 83
FYSBP (Appendix B). However, the lead ship was delayed in
the subsequent Five Year Shipbuilding Plans (Appendixes
C-E). Funds for the lead AOE will finally be requested in FY
87 budget (Appendix F) , but since this ship will not be built
until the next decade, she will be a replacement and not a
force builder. Therefore, the Navy will have only four AOEs
and seven AORs throughout the 1980s,
b. Fleet Oi 1 er
In the daisy chain replenishment concept, the
"Station Ships" (AOEs/AORs) are re-supplied by "shuttle
ships" which include fleet oilers (AO/TAO). ammunition ships
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(AE/TAE), and combat store ships < AFS/TAFS/TAF) . In this
scheme, the shuttle ships transport supplies from friendly
ports to the AOEs and AORs. This enhances the force
endurance by maintaining the station ships with the battle
groups.
The fleet oiler (AO) was the only group of
replenishment ships which received attention from the Carter
Administration. In 1978, there were 16 ships in the oiler
force. There were sign: fleet oilers (AGs) and eight
Military Seal if t Ccmmana Oilers (MSC). Since all sixteen
ships were rapidly nearing retirement, the Carter
Administration essentially planned an replacing the entire
force with the new Cimarron class r;eec oilers. Twenty snips
of the new Cimarron : : ass were ariginal ly planned, out on;
five ships were finally appropriated. The program was
eventually cancelled because the new oilers carried far less
fuel than the oilers being replaced. Five of the AOs were
transferred to the MSC and one was decommissioned.
By late 1981, the fleet oiler force was composed
of seven active duty AOs and 13 MSC oilers. Of the seven
AOs, there were five Cimarron ships appropriated under
Carter, and two 35 year old oilers. Since the Reagan
Administration shifted its emphasis to building the Henry J.
Kaiser (TAO-187) class of oilers for the MSC, no additional
ships in the Cimarron class oilers will be built during the
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1980s. However, the five Cimarron oilers are scheduled to be
enlarged during FY 88-FY 90, as seen in Appendixes E and F.
The MSC fleet oiler <TA0) was the only group of
replenishment ships which received dedicated attention during
the first six years of the Reagan Administration. President
Reagan inherited 13 old MSC fleet oilers, a cancelled
Cimarron shipbuilding program, and an attitude which placed a
heavy emphasis on using more civilian crews. Six of the TACs
were nearly 30 years old, with ac least ten more years of
service. The other seven ships were pushing 40, of which :wo
were already scheduled to ze leccmmi ss i onec in ".he next 'ear.
Within two years, ".wo of the MSC sh.ps were decommissioned.
Therefore, the Administration instrumented an aggressive
shipbuilding program to rebuild ana replace che TAOs. From
FY 82 to FY 86, nine of the ten requested Kaiser class oilers
were approved. Based on a shipbuilding time of four years,
as demonstrated by the lead ship HENRY J. KAISER (TAO-187),
seven of the nine ships should be in the fleet by 1989. The
Navy originally planned on building a total of 18 ships to
replace the 13 MSC oilers and the two oldest AOs. However,
as seen in Appendix F, the total number has been increased tc
19.
c. Ammunition Ships
The ammunition ships (AE/TAE) were shifted back
and forth throughout the decade, but there were no gains or
losses. In 1979, there were 13 AEs and no TAEs. Eight of
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the ships had been built during the late 1960s and the early
1970s. The other five ships, the Suribachi and Nitro
classes, were built in the 1950s. In 1980, two AEs were
transferred to the NRF , but were returned to active duty in
1982. In 1981, one AE was permanently transferred to the
MSC.
The lead ship for a new class of ammunition ship,
to replace the Suribachi and Nitro classes, was propcsec in
cne FY S3 FYSBP (Appendix B). CRef. 6:p. 1031 Funding for
the first of a four ship class was originally scheduled for
FY 35. out was continuously delayec in the following
shipbuilding plans (Appendixes C.-F). In Appendix F. note
that zhe total number of ships in the proposed c i ass nas oeen
increasea to five.
d. Combat Stores Ships
At the beginning of the Reagan Administration, the
Navy had seven middle-aged combat stores ships (AFSs), which
had entered the fleet during the 1960s. CRef. 5:pp. 172-173]
The MSC had one stores ship (TAF), and one leased with option
to buy British TAFS. The Navy would also rent a second
combat stores ship from the British Royal Fleet Auxiliary
(RFA) in 1981, under the same option. These two ships
(RFA LYNESS and RFA TARBATNESS) were eventually bought with
funds provided by the FY 82 budget. CRef. 22:p. 581] A third
ship (RFA STROMNESS) was acquired with FY 84 funds.
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[Ref. 17: p. 6343 The acquisitions of the three British
ships were the only changes to the combat stores ships from
1981 to 1986.
No further additions or deletions are expected
throughout the rest of the decade. One AFS , funding to be
requested in FY 87, was proposed in the FY 84 shipbuilding
program (Appendix C), but was deleted in the following Five
Year Shipbuilding Plans (Appendixes D-F).
10 . Material Support Ships
The material support ships are ins fleet tencers.
These ships are vital in sustaining a tasK group at sea.
The^r primary mission is to provice mobile on-site
maintenance ana repairs, ana to provice ot.ner support to
forward deployed units. The sn.os ;arry the tools,
instruments, and labor to provide the services which would
otherwise have to be performed at a friendly port. Their
services range from calibrating binoculars to repairing a
hull. There are three types of tenders: the destroyer
tenders <ADs), the submarine tenders CASs) , and the repair
tenders ( ARs)
.
The Samuel Gompers destroyer tender (ADs) class was
started in the 1960s to replace the World War Two vintage
Dixie and Klondike classes. Only two were built before
the program was cancelled because of cost overruns.
[Ref. 5: pp. 167-169] Under the Carter Administration, the
program was restarted and four ships were funded. Since the
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first ship of the four scheduled to be delivered in 1980 was
the USS YELLOWSTONE (AD-41), this new group of ships would be
renamed the Yellowstone class, even though they were the same
design as the Samuel Gompers class.
As the four Yellowstone ships entered the fleet, they
replaced the Dixie and Klondike ships on a one-for-one basis.
After the fourth ship was commissioned in 1983, a total of
nine destroyer tancers ser --ea the fleet. However, the "new"
force still contained :.^r?e 40 /ear old Dixie class ships.
Even though the Dixies have reached their service life, they
wi 1 most: 1 ikely remain n service unci: they are -ep ; acec.
Initial ' . the Reagan Administration iroppec the
Ye! Icws'.cne crcgram. However, an AD was scheduled in the 7*;"
33 and FY 34 shipbuilding programs, cue was subsequently
replaced by the repair tender CAR) program, as seen in
Appendixes B-D. Therefore, there are no more additions or
deletions expected throughout the rest of the 1980s.
In 1981, the four Ajax class repair ships (ARs) were
some of the oldest ships in the Navy. The four ships were
the only repair ships in commission during Carter / s and
Reagan's terms. Under the Reagan Administration, the FY 89
budget request would solicit shipbuilding funds for a new
class of repair tenders to replace the Ajax ships, as
presented in Appendix D. However, the request was delayed
until FY 90 in the FY 86 FYSBP (Appendix E), and was finally
deleted in next FYSBP (Appendix F).
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There are two categories of submarine tenders. The
distinction lies in their ability to service fleet ballistic
missile submarines (SSBN). Four submarine tenders have been
specifically designed and assigned for SSBN support, in
addition to two MSC cargo ships (TAK). These six ships have
been in service through the Carter Administration and will
serve throughout the 1980s.
The remaining submarine tenders service the fast
attack submarines. In che early 1970s, three new ships of
the L.Y. Spear/Emory S. Lane class were funded. These snips
replaced three or the o cer Fulton class around the ?nc of
the L970s ^na the oeginning of :ne 1980s. Mo Administration
nas planned on building additional ASs since the third ship
was appropriated in FY "3. Therefore^, the number of
submarine tenders, excluding the SSBN ASs, has centered
around eight. With the one-for-one exchange of the ASs, the
force level will remain constant into the 1990s.
11 . Fleet Support Ships
The Fleet Support Force consists of ships which are
involved with submarine surveillance (TAGOS), salvage and
towing < ARS/ATF/ATS > , and submarine rescue CASK). These
ships are non-comoatants , but perform necessary missions
vital to carrier battle groups and amphibious operations.
a. Ocean Surveillance Ships
The ocean surveillance ship (TAGCS) was designed
to support tne Surveillance Towed Array Sensory System
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(SURTASS). Assigned to the MSC, the TAGOS/SURTASS combined
would collect and process undersea acoustic data. This
information would be integrated with other surveillance data
to monitor submarine activity.
The TAGOS shipbuilding program began in 1979 and
was continued under the Reagan Administration. An aggressive
program, a total of 12 ships were funded with the passage of
the FY 82 budget. However, during the next two fiscal years,
the program came to a standstill because of problems
associated with the sonar. In FY 35. the program was
re-started when two of the three ships requested were funded.
By this time another deficiency became apparent".
The TAGOS was designed as a monohull ship, which aid not
provide the stabi; ity necessary to gather acoustic aata in
the northern hemisphere. To overcome this limitation, the
Navy re-designed the TAGOS, and increased the desired force
number of ships. The new TAGOS would be dual hull and would
be called TAGOS (SWATH). SWATH stood for Small Waterplane
Area Twin Hull. The dual hull would provide the stability to
conduct surveillance operations in the northern hemisphere in
adverse weather. The Navy still wanted 18 TAGOS, but now
also wanted eight TAGOS (SWATH). In FY 86, Congress
appropriated the money to build one TAGOS and the lead TAGOS
(SWATH) ship. This brought the total number of appropriated
TAGOS ships to 15, excluaing the TAGOS (SWATH) ship. In the
FY 87 FYSBP, (Appendix F) the last three TAGOS will be
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appropriated in FY 87, and the final seven TAGOS (SWATH)
ships will be appropriated during the FY 88 through FY 90
t i me frame
.
The shipbuilding contract for the first 12 ships
were awarded to Tacoma Boat. By 1986, eight ships were in
the fleet; however, it was doubtful that the remaining four
ships would be finished on schedule. Tacoma had gross losses
during previous years, and had halted all work on TAGOS
projects. All employees associated with the TAGOS project,
including the office management, had been either laid cff or
fired. In reviewing the situation, the Maw felt that Taccma
would be able to cqmplete :vc of '.he four ships wi-th the
remaining availaole funas. However, the ether two snips
wou ! a have :c te submitted :cr lew competition, which woul :
eventually delay their delivery date by 30 months. [Ref. 20:
pp. 321-324] In effect, this meant that only ten of the
first 12 ships appropriated through FY 82 will be in
commission by 1989.
The contract for the two ships appropriated in FY
85 was awarded to Halter Marine and was scheduled to be
completed before 1989. Since the ships appropriated after FY
85 will not be completed until the 1990s, Table 6 reflects a
total of 12 TAGOS ships for 1989.
b. Salvage Ships
The salvage ships CARS) provide towing and
salvage services for battle groups and amphibious assaults.
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They carry compressed air diving equipment to allow sustained
underwater hull work. They also have medical facilities to
support diving operations. In peacetime, as in wartime, the
ARSs are forward deployed to support the fleet.
In 1981, there were six salvage ships. These
ships were built during the 1940s and were scheduled to be
retired due to age. The ships, like the MSOs, had obsolete
machinery which was not supportable. Spare parts were hard,
if not ;mpossic:e, to cctam since the manufacturers haa gone
cut of business. They vers also unaoie to tow the new larger
snip classes. [Ref. 3: -p. 1056-1 057]
Under the Reagan Administration, the Navy planned
on building rive ARSs zz :ne new Safeguara ciass. These
snips wouid rep ace the six aging snips anc fulfill the
balanced force structure requirement.
During the next three years, four ships were
funded and were scheduled to be completed by 1986. The fifth
ship was rescheduled from FY 84 to FY 91 as seen in
Appendixes A-F. The four Safeguard ships replaced the World
War Two vintage on a one-for-one basis. By the end of 1986,
the salvage force was composed of four new ships and two of
the remaining older ships. The last two aging ships will be
decommissioned or transferred to the NRF by 1989. [Ref. 6:p.
102] If transferred to the NRF, the ARS will be Category B
ships and not counted in the total ship count.
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c. Submarine Rescue Ships
At the beginning of the 1980s, there were six
submarine rescue ships (ASR) in two different classes. The
four ships of the Chanticleer class were built during the
1940s. Even though the Chanticleer class was built
principally for submarine rescue operations, the tugboat
design could also be used for salvage and towing.
The other two ships were in the Pigeon class.
These snips were built in the early 1970s, and were designee
only for suomarme rescue operations. This class was unique
in cnat it had a catamaran design. The two hulls were bu 1 ; t
to supper: a Zaeo Submergence Rescue Vehicle CDSRV).
Allowing up cc eight Givers to work in aepths of 1.000 feet,
the DSRV was isec to save crewmen in disaolea submarines
which were trapped on the ocean floor above the hull collapse
depth
.
In 1986, all six ships were still in commission.
However, the Reagan Administration did not plan on expanding
the ASR force, or replacing the older ships. Since the ships
of the Chanticleer class are well over 40 years old, they
will most likely oe decommissioned by 1989.
d. Salvage and Rescue Ships
Only three salvage and rescue (ATS) ships were in
commission when the Balanced Force Structure Program was
promulgated. The Eaenton class ATSs were ocean-going tugs
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built in the early 1970s, and were designed to also support
salvage and diving operations.
Under the Reagan Administration, the force
structure would require a minimum of three Edenton ATSs and
five ARSs. CRef. ll:pp. 700-7283 As previously stated, the
new ARSs were scheduled in the shipbuilding plans. However,
the three Edenton ATSs were already in commission and would
not reach the end of their service life until after the turn
of che century. Therefore, the Administrac.cn is not
building any more ATSs. ^Appendixes A-F)
e. Fleet Tugs
Ai . fleet tugs .TAT?) were operated ov cne MSC
with civilian crews by .981. Specifically built wicn a
commercial design for cne MSC, the seven new Powhatan class
tugs entered the fleet in the early 1980s and replaced the
World War Twd ATFs. There will not be any further additions
or deletions.
12. Strategic Submarine Force
By 1981, the strategic submarine (SSBN) force
consisted of 31 Lafayette Poseidon submarines and two
Benjamin Franklin Polaris submarines. As discussed in the
previous chapter, the last two Polaris submarines would be
converted to attack submarines within the next few years.
Also, 12 of the Lafayette submarines would be modified to
carry the new TRIDENT I SLBM by 1985. The remaining 19
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Lafayette boats would be active until ultimately replaced by
the Ohio class.
After suffering cost overruns and schedule delays in
the 1970s, the Ohio class shipbuilding program was finally on
track by 1981. A total of nine ships were appropriated when
President Reagan took office, and the first one was scheduled
to enter the fleet in 1982. Also like Carter, Reagan planned
on builaing three ships every two years. Lixe Carter, Reagan
was unaole to gain congressional support, ana ccnceaec to one
ship per fiscal year. This can oe seen in the Five Year
Shipbuilding Pians in Appencixes A-F. Except for che FY 32
FYSBP , which was the original pi an. :ne only deviation from
cne one snip request was in the FY 33 FYSBP. Two submarines
were requestea in FY" 33 :a compensate- for :ne submarine which
was not funded in FY 82. Consequently, Congress only
appropriated funding for one of the two ships requested in FY
83, thereby delaying Reagan's overall plan by one submarine.
After FY 83, Congress funded one Ohio submarine for the next
three fiscal years in accordance with the budget requests.
With the passage of the FY 86 Appropriation Bill, Congress
approved a total of 13 Ohio class submarines.
By 1986, the force was composed of 12 Lafayette
Trident I modified, 16 Lafayette Poseidon, and eight Ohio
submarines. Based on the number of launchers, the eight Ohio
class submarines replaced the ten Polaris and three Lafayette
Poseidon submarines. Therefore, the total number of
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launchers was 640. This tends to confirm the assumption made
in Chapter Two that the Administration would maintain
approximately 656 launchers, which would require one Ohio
submarine to replace 1.5 Polaris or Poseidon submarines.
Of the total 13 Ohio class boats approved through
1986, and based on a shipbuilding time of six years, ten of
the boats would be operational by 1989. Therefore, the
number of Lafayette Tricent I coats would still be the same,
but there wouia oe 13 Pose i ccn ooats.
3 . SUMMARY
A review nr :he ri story di the shipbuilding programs ana
:ne Naval force Summaries .'see Tao i e 5) our -, ng the L980s snow
that Presicent. Reagan did mdertake ana accomplish a massive
ouiia-up cf cne Navy. By cne enc of the aecade , cne Navy
would have approximately 586 ships in its inventory and 19
ships under construction. Although this is an impressive
accomplishment, there are several points which must also be
consi dered.
Since many of the ship categories faced block
obsolescence when President Reagan took office, the build-up
had to incorporate replacements for the aging ships.
Therefore, from the very beginning, the Fleet Expansion
Program was handicapped. As seen in the previous sections,
funding which could have been used elsewhere in the expansion
was oftentimes used to replace antiquated ships. Although
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many ships were replaced during the 1980s, the block
obsolescence would continue until the turn of the century.
Hence, new shipbuilding programs, such as the CG-47, LHD-1,
DDG-51 or SSN-21 programs, would be required to fill the
impending defense gaps.
For the most part, the Five Year Shipbuilding Plans from
FY 82 to FY 86 (see Appendixes A-E) were stable in that the
goals were not significantly changed. However, there were
shipDuiiaing programs for a few snip categories which were
delayed, reduced, cr cancelled. There were four ship types
wh 1 en were scheduled In the JYSBPs ana suDsequenc l y delayed.
The four catagor:as were the ACS snaticn ship, the AE
ammunition snip, the AD aestroyer cenaer, and the APS saivage
ship. tfhi.le there was never any construction en ships in the
first three categories, there were four ARSs built in the
early 1980s. However, the last ship was continuously
delayed. Furthermore, the Spruance class destroyer
shipbuilding program was ultimately reduced to 31 ships, and
the LPDX dock transport program was finally cancelled.
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IV. THE NAVY^S EMPHASIS AFTER 1989
Chapter Two developed the Balanced Force Structure Model,
which presented the force level goals of the Fleet Expansion
Program. (Table 2) To accomplish these new goals, the Navy
would require at least 639 ships. This new force would
represent the minimum force level needed, to regain maritime
superiority. It would also represent the maximum risk
acceptable to the Reagan Administration.
Chapter Three examined the history of the shipbuilding
programs under the Reagan Administration. Trom this
information, the prospective Summary for the U.S. Naval
Fcroes In 1989 - aee Tab; a 5) vas developed. As seen in
Chapter Three, the Navy will have 586 ships in the fleet and
19 ships undergoing construction by the end of the decade.
Therefore, the Administration is claiming that the 600-Ship
Navy goal will be achieved. However, the fleet will still
not have a balanced force structure, since the force level
will be still be over forty ships short of the requirements
imposed by the Balanced Force Structure Model.
This chapter uses the information developed in the
previous two chapters to determine whether the Navy will
continue to pursue the progression of a balanced force
structure, or will shift its emphasis to sustaining a 600
ship count.
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Initially, the Summary of U.S. Naval Forces in 1989 is
compared against the Balanced Force Structure Model. This
process identifies those ship categories which will not meet
force level goals by the end of the decade.
The second half of this chapter succinctly determines the
status of the Fleet Expansion Program. The ship categories
which were identified in the previous section are evaluated
in the most recent Five Year Shipbuilding Plan CFYSBP). If
the deficient ship categories are included in the FYSBP, and
if the additional shipbuilding programs will increase the
size of the fleet, then the Navy 13 still pursuing the
expansion of the balanced rorce structure. Cn the other
hand, if the deficient ship categories are induced, but are
intenced to be used ^s replacements, then the Naw has
shifted its emphasis to sustaining the 600 ship count.
Table 7 depicts the comparison of the prospective Summary
of the U.S. Naval Forces in 1989 against the Balanced force
Structure Model. There are two columns under the category
called "Number of Ships." The first column, listed as
"Objective", represents the goals of the Force Structure
Model. The second column, listed as "Modified 1989",
represents the force level by 1989, including the ships under
construction which were funded from FY 81 to FY 86.
Figure 4 identifies those ship categories appropriated
before FY 87 which would still be under construction by 1989.
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TABLE 7
Comparison of Prospective Summary
U.S. Naval Forces in 1989 with the
Balanced Force Structure Model
Number of Ships









Aircraft Carriers (CV/CVN)- deployable 15 15
Surface Combatants
Battleships (BB)
Cruisers guicea missile CCG/CGN)
Destroyers DD) *
Destroyers guicec missile (DDG)
Frigates CFF/FFG) *
Attack Submarines v'3S/33N)
Patrol Craft Cornea cant 3 CPHM) 6 5
Suototai . ccmoacants 363 360
Ampnioious Ships
Command Sh.p 'ICO 2 2
Assault Transport CLKA) 5 5
Landing Ship Transport ;LST) x 20 20
Helo Assault Ship (LHA) 5 5
Helo Transport Ship (LPH) 5
General Purpose Assault (LHD) 12 2
Landing Ship Dock (LSD) 17 13
Dock Transport (LPD) 13 13
Subtotal, Amphibious 74 65
Mine Warfare Ships
Minesweepers (MSO) 3
Mine Countermeasures CMCM) 14 11
Minehunters (MSH) 17 5
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AIRCRAFT CARRIER (CVN) 2
STATUS
USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN (CVN-72)
will expand the fleet. USS
GEORGE WASHINGTON (CVN-73)
will replace the CORAL SEA
(CV-43), which will relieve
the LEXINGTON CCVT-16) as a
training ship. MIDWAY CCV-41)
will remain operational until
sne is rep t aceo by another
carrier which will be
appropriated In FY92.
ATTACK SUBMARINES C SSN ) 3
suDmar :nes
These Los Angeles class
wi I 1 serve as replacements on a
one- for -one oasis.
GEN. PUR. ASSAULT CLHD) Wi ' I repl ace the fte.l o Transport
Ships (LPH) on a one-for-one
basis.
OILER (TAO) Will be used to replace the six
ships of the old Neosho and
Mispillion classes.
SURVEILLANCE (T-AGOS) Wi 1 1 expand the T-AGOS force
Figure 4 Ships Undergoing Construction
Appropriated from FY 81 to FY 86 as of 1989
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Figure 4 also explains how those ships would eventually
affect the Naval Summary. These calculations are included in
the Modified 1989 category in Table 7.
This thesis uses the above calculations in the comparison
with the Force Model, since this is a technique used by the
Navy, as discussed in Chapter One. By assuming that all
ships have been built, at a particular period in time, future
force level deficiencies can be determined. This also
facilitates the comparison in the next section which includes
the ships requested in the FY 37 7Y33P
.
Finally, the addition of the snips undergoing
construction will net nave a ma.v cr impact an the tocze
summary, and does not affect the outcome of the research.
A. COMPARISON Of THE FLEET IN 1989 WITH THE BALANCED FORCE
STRUCTURE MODEL
As seen in Table 7, there will be 12 ship categories
which will not meet force level goals. These areas are
discussed in the following section.
1 . Surface Combatants
Under the area of surface combatants, the destroyer
force will be the only category which will be deficient.
Recall from Chapter Three that 31 Spruance class destroyers
(DD) replaced all aging destroyers, with the exception of one
which was assigned to the NRF Category A Mobilization Forces.
Furthermore, the Spruance class shipbuilding program was
cancelled after 31 platforms were funded. Therefore, there
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will be only 32 DDs in 1989. This will leave a shortage of
five DDs by the end of the decade.
By 1989, there will be 38 guided missile destroyers
(DDG). Therefore, the DDG force will be 29 ships short of
the force level goal. Of the 38 ships, 33 will reach
retirement age during the 1990s.
2. Amphibious Ships
In the area of amphibious warfare, 74 ships would be
requirea :c lift a 1.5 MAF. 3y 1989, there will oe on i y 63
ships. This shortage will primarily be in cwo categories.
The General Purpose Assault CLHD) force will have only :vc of
:ne requxrec .2 -nips. As originally planned, seven LHDs
would repiace the seven Selo Transport Ships CLPH), ana -/r.-a
remaining five would augment: the amphibious rorce. 3y L989,
two LHDs will have replaced two LPHs. Since this program
only began in the late 1980s, it will most likely be included
in the FYSBP.
The Landing Ship Dock (LSD) platforms will be four
ships short of the goal. Eight of the 13 ships will be of
the new LSD-41 Whidbey Island class which ultimately replaced
eight Thomaston class ships. The other five ships will be in
the older Anchorage LSD-36 class, which will be operational
until the turn of the century. In pursuing the LSD-41
shipbuilding program, the Reagan Administration was undecided
about the total number of ships to build. Initially, the FY
83 FYSBP, (Appendix B) projected eight more LSD-41 class
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ships, in addition to the two ships which had been previously
approved. Therefore, there would be ten LSD-41 class ships
and five Anchorage class ships. In the next FYSBP, (Appendix
C) with three ships under construction, the total was
increased to 12 LSD-41 class platforms. Under this plan, the
Administration would have reached the goal. However, the
total number of ships was finally reduced to eight in the FY
85 FYSBP. as seen in Appendix D. Therefore, the total numDer





ge War f are Sh i os
VI though the shipbuilding programs for the Mine
Count srmeasure (MCM) =nc tine Minehunter (MSH) suffered many
setoacKs. the Administration continueo to request funding fcr
.he construction of these ships. Based ^n -.he assumptions
that all construction problems would be corrected and that
all ships funded up to and including FY 86 would be built by
the end of the decade, the mine warfare forces would still be




Except for the three British acquisitions for the
TAFS force, the only other force to receive attention from
the Reagan Administration was the oilers. In an effort to
rebu i 1 a the MSC oilers <TAO), the Administration pursued an
aggressive shipbuilding plan. However, by 1989 there will
still be a shortage of nine ships.
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As seen in Appendixes A through E, funding requests
for the station ships (AOE) and the ammunition ships (AE)
were continuously delayed. These two categories of ships
will be less than the force goals by 1989, and will be facing
retirement in the 1990s.
5 . Fleet Support Ships
The surveillance ships (T-AGOS) would be three ships
short of meeting force goals, but the additional ships would
most likely oe request eo. in future funding, since :here was
much interest in this program curing the cast few years. Cn
the other hand, suffering rrcrn age and neglect, the submarine
rescue rcrce would oe reduced by four snips :rcm the -980s.
The salvage force would ce sncrz by one ARS salvage snip.
B. FISCAL YEAR 1987 FIVE YEAR SHIPBUILDING PLAN
Based on the information presented, the Navy will have
approximately 600 ships by the end of the decade. To reach
the 600-Ship Navy goal, the new ships which were constructed
during the 1980s were essentially appropriated during FY 81
to FY 86. However, the goal for a balanced force structure
would come from shipbuilding appropriations after FY 86.
Therefore, an examinaticn of the FY 87 FYSBP will determine
if the Navy is still pursuing a balanced structure, or if the
emphasis is on sustaining a 600 ship count.
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Table 8 is a modified version of the FY 87 FYSBP. Only
those ship categories which are counted in the Navy's total
ship count are presented in the Table.
Although the entire FY 87 FYSBP is presented in Appendix F,
Table 8 is provided herein for easy reference.
Upon initial examination of Table 8, recall that the
first four ship categories in the FYSBP will meet the
balanced force level objectives. This seems to imply that
the Navy is continuing the expansion of snip categories
beyona the minimum force level requirements. However, a
quicK review of Chapter Three will snow that these ships are
scheduled for replacements. The Ohio Trident class
suomarines (5S3N; will rep I ice :he retiring Lafayette
Poseidon submarines. The Los Angeles 3SN-638 ana the new
Seawolf SSN-21 classes will replace three aging attack
submarine classes. Finally, the Ticonderoga CG-47 class
guided missile cruiser will replace the 21 cruisers built in
the 1960s. Therefore, the first four ship categories in
Table 8 would sustain the total ship count since they would
essentially be used to replace aging assets on a one-for-one
basis.
In comparison with the FY 87 FYSBP, the following
sections evaluate those ship categories which will be less
than the minimum balanced force structure requirements by the
end of the decade.
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TABLE 8




FY 88 FY 89 FY 90 FY 91
TRIDENT 1 1 1 1 1
SSN 688 4 3 3 4 1
SSN 21 1 2
CG 47 2 2 2 2
DDG 51 3 3 3 3 5
LHD 1 L 1 :
LSD 41 (Variant) 1 1 1 l
MCM 3
MSH -s 4 4
AGE 5 L <i 1 1L
TAG 2 2 2 2 2
AE 1 2
TAGGS 3 3 2 2
ARS •
TOTAL 20 24 21 18 17










* The FY 87 FYSBP has been modified to include only those




With the exception of the CG-47 class, the Arleigh
Burke DDG-51 guided missile destroyer class will be the only
other surface combatant in the FY 87 FYSBP. Although there
would be a shortage of destroyers and guided missile
destroyers in the balanced fleet concept, the DDG-51
shipbuilding program would be used to replace the 33 DDGs
facing retirement in the 1990s.
2. Amphibious Ships
According to the original plan, seven Genera! Purpose
Assault CLHD) snips would replace the He i o Transpor - Ships
CLPH), ana five acditionai LHDs would be built to augment the
force. under the FY 87 FYSBP, chree General Purpose Assau i
t
CLHD) snips would be constructed, in addition to the two
ships in the fleet by 1989. Therefore, based on the
assumption that it would take four years to build, the total
number of LHDs would be five by FY 95. Since these ships
will ultimately replace the original seven LPHs on a
one-for-one basis, the Navy would have to build two more
LHDs. Furthermore, based on a 30 year life span, the LPHs
would have to be decommissioned during the mid 1990s.
Therefore, the three LHDs scheduled in the FY 87 FYSBP must
be considered as replacements. In other words, the seven
LPHs would have to be replaced before the five LHDs could be
considered as force builders.
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Four Landing Ship Dock (LSD) platforms are scheduled
for the next five years. However, these ships will be
modifications to the standard Whidbey Island LSD-41 class in
that the new LSD-41 Variant class will be smaller than the
original class. The additional four ships will allow the LSD
category to meet the force level goals.
Originally, an experimental Dock Transport (LPDX)
program was proposed to replace the 13 LPDs nearing Dlock
oDsoiescsnce in the 1990s. However, the LPDX program was
suosequently dropped, and was replaced by the new LSD-41
Variant class. Under :he new p i an . four LSD-41 Variant class
ships would replace cwo old LPDs, ana the remaining LPDs
would undergo a SLEP
.
Therefore, the LSD-41 Variant shipouiiding program
could be considered a force builder since it will expand the
LSD force, or it could be considered as replacements since it
will replace the LPDs. In this research, the author will
take the middle of the road approach. It is recognized that
two of the LSD-41 Variant ships will be replacements for the
two LPDs, while it is also recognized that the other two
LSD-41 Variant ships will be force builders.
3. Mine Warfare Ships
Although the MCM and MSH shipbuilding programs
suffered many delays, the ships included in the FY 87 FYSBP
will complete the force level goals. With the additional
three MCMs to be requested in FY 88, the MCM force will total
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14 ships. With the additional 12 MSHs to be requested from
FY 87 to FY 89, the MSH force will meet the minimum
requirements for 17 platforms. Even though the MCMs will
replace the remaining three minesweepers (MSO), the MCMs were
principally used for expansion. Therefore, the MCM and the
MSH shipbuilding programs will be force builders.
4. Replenishment Ships
As stated in the preceding section, the station ships
(AOE) and the ammunition ships CAE) will oe decommissioned in
the 1990s. New construction for these two ship categories
was cone inuous i y delayed thrcugncut the 1980s. Therefore,
the four AOEs ana the five A£s in the FY 87 shipbui I ding plan
will be replacements on a cne-fcr-cne basis.
However, the "^SC oiler TAG) shipouilaing program
will replace older assets and expand the force. Of the ten
ships planned, four ships will replace on a one-for-one basis
the last four aging ships. The remaining six ships will
expand the force. Therefore, since there were 18 oilers in
1989, of which four will be replaced, the additional six
ships will increase the force level to 24 fleet oilers.
5
.
Fleet Support Shi ps
Like the MCM and MSH programs, the ocean surveillance
(T-AGOS) shipbuilding program ran into construction problems.
However, to fulfill force level goals, the final three T-AGOS
ships would be requested in FY 87. Whereas the remaining
seven ships included in the shipbuilding plan would go beyond
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the minimum balanced force level requirements. However,
these ships were not originally included in the Balanced
Force Structure Model, since they will be the new T-AGOS
(SWATH) class. After the original T-AGOS ships were built,
the Navy discovered that the platform could not operate in
the northern hemisphere. Therefore, the T-AGOS (SWATH) class
would be built to compensate for the design deficiencies of
the original T-AGOS class.
Of the remaining two categories of Fleet Support
Ships which would ce deficient, the salvage (ARS) fores will
be expanded to meet the force level requirements with the
final snip cc ce requested m FY 91. On the other hanc, the
submarine rescue (AS??) force was the only deficient category
not included in the fY 37 7YS3P
.
C. SUMMARY
In comparing the deficient ship categories with the FY 87
FYSBP , there were two ship categories which were not included
in the shipbuilding plan. These categories were the
submarine rescue ship (ASR) and the DD destroyer force.
Except for these two deficient categories, the other ten ship
types which were below force level requirements were included
in the FY 87 FYSBP. However, out of a total of 100 ships to
be requested in the next five years, 68 ships would be used
for replacements.
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In a limited sense, the Reagan Administration would
continue to expand the fleet in accordance with the balanced
force structure concept. The Mine Countermeasures programs,
the ARS program, and the T-AGOS programs would serve to
expand the fleet. The LSD-41 Variant and the TAO
shipbuilding programs would replace decommissioning ships and
increase the number of their respective force. All five
programs wcu;d serve to expand the total ship count tc 500 .
so that one 01 :ne goals of the Fleet Expansion Program would
be accomplished unaer this Five Year Plan. Furthermore, bhe
minimum force level goals and shipbuilding programs *ould oe
ccmptacea in tne Mine Coun cermeasures , T-AGOS, ARS, ana ioD
forces.
However. ~.he remaining eight sn i .odu i 1 ci r.g programs i.n :.w.e
Five Year Plan would be used as replacements. Of these eight
different programs, four would be used as replacements for
ship categories which would meet or exceed force level goals
by 1989. The other four programs would be used as
replacements in categories which were desperately below the
balanced force level goals.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. STATUS OF THE FLEET EXPANSION PROGRAM
In this thesis a historical research of the Naval
shipbuilding programs and appropriations throughout the 1980s
was conducted. This information was used to build a model of
the balanced force structure and to trace the development of
the Fleet Expansion Program. In ouiiding the Balancea Force
Structure Model , several Key elements cecame apparent.
First, since the build-up was constrained cy the oucget, the
model representea an acsciuta minimum rorca level necessary
to control the seas. Second, bhere was a strong
interdependence ana intradependence of :he task groups.
Therefore, any deviation from the Balanced Force Structure
Model would adversely affect the task groups' effectiveness
and ability to survive.
After tracing the history of shipbuilding programs for
each ship type, the modified 1989 Naval Force Summary was
constructed and was compared with the Balanced Force
Structure Model. This comparison was used to determine those
ship categories which would not meet the force level
objectives. It also revealed that the Navy would have over
600 ships fully funded with the FY 86 budget appropriations.
Therefore, any shipbuilding after FY 87 would either have to
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build the Balanced Force Structure Model or sustain the 600
ship count
.
To determine the status of the Fleet Expansion Program,
the force level deficiencies identified in the 1989 Summary
were compared with the FY 87 Five Year Shipbuilding Plan. To
facilitate the final evaluation, a criteria was established.
If the deficient ship categories were included in the FY 87
FYSBP and would increase the size of the fleet, then the
Administration would still be building a balanced force
structure. On the other hand, if "he ship categories were
not included, or if they were included out vou 1 d be usee -or
replacements, ".hen the Administration's emohasis would ce nn
sustaining a 500 ship count.
The analysis rav^aiec that :here vas not a -lear cue
distinction. Two deficient ship categories were not included
in the five year plan. The remaining ten categories, which
were below force level requirements, were included in the FY
87 FYSBP. However, these ten shipbuilding programs were
essentially equally divided between those which would expand
the balanced force structure, and those which would be used
for replacements.
Although the distinction is not clear cut, a closer
examination of the FY 87 FYSBP indicates that there is a
slight emphasis on building and sustaining a 600 ship count.
Out of the 100 ships to be requested in the next five years,
68 ships will be used for replacements. Of the remaining 32
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ships, 21 ships (three MCMs, 12 MSHs, and six T-AGOs) were
scheduled to be completed by 1986, but were delayed by
construction problems. Hence, these 21 ships are carryover
shipbuilding programs and cannot be considered as full fledge
programs designed to continue the expansion of the Balanced
Force Structure Model beyond the 600 ship goal. Furthermore,
four other ships (T-AGO SWATH) were unplanned additions to
the force structure. Therefore, the FY 87 FYSBP's expansion
of the oaiancec force structure would be very limited.
3. RECOMMENDATIONS
?r3sen r. . ', :r:er-? 3 an indication '.hat the sn:?cu. iing
programs ir^ limed ii replacing :he aging snips ana
sustaining a 600 3h.o :cunc. However, the importance or i
oaiancec force structure nas oeen sncwn in Jhapter Two. This
interdependence and intradependence of the various task
groups is necessary for survival and control of the seas.
Hence, it is necessary to continue the development of the
Force Structure Model. Only those ships which are below
force level objectives should be built until the total
Balanced Force is complete.
Still, there is the problem of the ships facing
retirement. As seen throughout this thesis, there are
various ways to alleviate the burden of the impending block
oosolescence of many ships until the balanced force is
complete. The most obvious solution is to extend those ships
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which still have useful service lives beyond their retirement
age. Other ships could undergo a SLEP similar to the
carriers and the LPDs. Moreover, certain task group missions
could be augmented by other ship types. Specifically, the
destroyer forces could be augmented by the excessive number
of guided missile frigates and guided missile cruisers.
Until enough destroyers are built to meet force level
objectives, the frigates and the cruisers, both of which are
over their force level requirements, could be used to neec
the destroyers' task group requirements.
Finally, if :ne Navy is unable to build all of the
remaining snips necessary to -neec the 3aiancea Force
od.j actives, chen a new 3a lanced Force Structure Model needs
to ce ieve i oped to incorporate the limitations.. This would
increase the risk above the maximum amount originally
acceptable to the Reagan Administration. However, it is far
more important to balance the available assets in order to
support the interdependence and intradependence of the task
groups. If the task groups are not properly supported, then




FY 82 NAVY FIVE YEAR SHIP
CONSTRUCTION/CONVERSION PLAN
FY82 FY83 FY84* FY85* FY86*
NEW CONSTRUCTION
TRIDENT 1 1 1 2 1
SSN-688 2 1 1 1 2
SSN (FA class) 1
CVN 1
CG-4? 3 2 4 4 4
3S C]<eac~; 1 i
DDG-51 (DDGX) 1
LSD-41 I
7FG 7 3 o




TAG i - 2 2
NRF CORVETTE (FFX) 1 2 3
fARX 1 L 2 2 2
Subtotal 19 14 19 18 20
SLEPs, CONVERSIONS, REACTIVATIONS, AND ACQUISITIONS
CV SLEP








TOTAL 33 18 22 20 20
* Subject to change
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APPENDIX B
FY 83 NAVY FIVE YEAR SHIP
CONSTRUCTION/CONVERSION PLAN
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8 21 24 32 38Subtotal










TOTA] 25 23 29 33 39
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APPENDIX C
FY 84 NAVY FIVE YEAR SHIP
CONSTRUCTION/CONVERSION PLAN
FY84 FY85 FY86 FY87 FY88
NEW CONSTRUCTION
TRIDENT 11111
SSN-688 3 4 4 5 5
CVN 1
CG-47 3 3 3 3 2
DDG-51 1 3 5
DD-°63
LSD-41 122:2











Subtotal 17 21 28 28 30
SLEPs, CONVERSIONS, REACTIVATIONS, AND ACQUISITIONS
CV SLEP 1 1
BB (React) 1 1
















FY 85 NAVY FIVE YEAR SHIP
CONSTRUCTION/CONVERSION PLAN



















1 1 1 1 1
4 4 4 4 4
1
3 3 3 2 2







4 4 i 4





TOTAL 23 27 22 24 25
SLEPs, CONVERSIONS, REACTIVATIONS, AND ACQUISITIONS


















FY 86 NAVY FIVE YEAR SHIP
CONSTRUCTION/CONVERSION PLAN
NEW CONSTRUCTION


















1 1 1 1 1
4 4 4 2
1
4
3 3 3 2
2 5 5 5
2
I 1 1 i
2 2 2
4 1









TOTAL 23 20 25 22
SLEPs, CONVERSIONS, REACTIVATIONS, AND ACQUISITIONS




















FY 87 NAVY FIVE YEAR SHIP
CONSTRUCTION/CONVERSION PLAN
NEW CONSTRUCTION
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TOTAL 21 24 21 20




























































Category A Moblization Forces: FF
LST 2 DD 30 FFG AE
SOURCE: Jane's Fighting Ships 1979-80




U.S. NAVAL FORCE SUMMARY
(BY SHIP TYPE)
combatant amph ibious ships
CV/CVN 10/3 LCC 2
BB LKA 5
DD/DDG 39/37 LST 18
CGy CGN I =>/3 LPD 13
FF/FFG 59/5 • LHA/1LHD 4/0
5S 5 LPH —>i














: ?ec succor-. 3h ps
.Tiacsr: a; support ships TAGOS
AD 10 ARS B
AS 12 ASR 6
AR 4 ATS 3
strategic sub force ATF/TATF 0/2
LAFAYETTE TRIDENT
LAFAYETTE POSEIDON 31 ALLEN POLARIS 8
Category A Moblization Forces: FF
LST 2 DD 20 FFG AE 2
SOURCE: Jane's Fighting Ships 1980-81



































:'. ee r. supper- ships
material supper- snips TAGOS ]
AD 9 ARS 5
AS 13 ASR 5
AR 4 ATS 3
strategic sub force ATF/TATF 0/7
LAFAYETTE TRIDENT
LAFAYETTE POSEIDON 31 ALLEN POLARIS
Category A Moblization Forces: FF 4
LST 2 DD 9 FFG AE 2
SOURCE: Jane's Fighting Ships 1981-82
















































Category A Moblization Forces: FF 4
LST 2 DD 5 FFG AE
SOURCE: Jane's Fighting Ships 1982-83


















































Category A Moblization Forces: FF 6
LST 2 DD 3 FFG AE
SOURCE: Jane's Fighting Ships 1983-84




U.S. NAVAL FORCE SUMMARY
<BY SHIP TYPE)
combat arit amphibious ships repl enishment ships
CV/CVN 10/4 LCC 2 AOE 4
BB 2 LKA 5 AOR 7
DD/DDG 31/37 LST 18 AO/TAO 7/11
CG/CGN 20/9 LPD 13 AE/TAE 12/1
FF/FFG 53/40 LHA/LHD 5/0 TAF 1
33 4 LPH 7 AFS/TAFS 7/3
S3N >2 LSD L 1 rtaec support sn ips
PHM 5 -nacsr : a i suppor'" sn i ps : rAGOS 5
.ill ne var ' "t 3iC^ AD 9 iRS 5
MSC 3 AS 12 ASR 6
MCM AR 4 ATS 3
MSH strategic sub f iDree ATF/TATF 0/7
OHIO TRIDENT 4 LAFAYETTE TRIDENT
LAFAYETTE POSEIDON 31 ALLEN POLARIS
Category• A Mobl
i
zation Forces: FF 6
LST 2 :DD 1 FFG 1 AE
SOURCE: Jane's Fighting Ships 1984-85




U.S. NAVAL FORCE SUMMARY
(BY SHIP TYPE)
combatant amphibious ships
CV/CVN 10/4 LCC 2
BB 2 LKA 5
DD/DDG 31/37 LST 18
CG/CGN 22/9 LPD 13
FF/FFG 52/48 LHA/LHD 3/0
S3 4 LPH 7
S3N 97 LSD 11
PHM 5 mater iaJ support snips
mine warfare AD 9
ASO 3 AS 12
MCM AR 4
MSH strategic sub force
OHIO TRIDENT 6 LAFAYE














Category A Moblization Forces: FF 7
LST 2 DD 1 FFG 5 AE
SOURCE: Jane's Fighting Ships 1985-86

















































Category A Moblization Forces: FF 8
LST 2 DD 1 FFG 9 AE
SOURCE: Jane's Fighting Ships 1986-87
Jane's Publishing Incorporated, New YorK 1986
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